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"Hope of the Nation" Reports the Taliban Falling Apart
Not Specified
15 January 2008
Combined Joint Task Force
The internal strife within the Taliban and between their Al Qaeda and sometime Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) allies has been increasing as reported here and here. As their insurgency wears on, the Afghan people themselves grow increasingly disenfranchised with their former rulers. The Afghan Daily, Arman-E Melli (Hope of the Nation) published their views in a story entitled “The Taliban Do Not Have an Alternative to End the War”. In the 9 January edition, published in Dari and Pashtun, they began by pointing out the sack of Mullah Mansur Dadollah by Mullah Omar, ostensibly the “Spiritual Leader” of the Taliban.
http://cjtf-a.com/index.php/Recent-Events/Hope-of-the-Nation-Reports-the-Taliban-Falling-Apart.html[Time out problem]
[Combined Joint Task Force -82 - CJTF-82 - Hope of the Nation Reports the Taliban Falling Apart.mht]


Talibanisation & Poor Governance
Not Specified
15 April 2007
Shirkat Gah - Women’s Resource Centre
This Second Shadow Report, Talibanisation & Poor Governance: Undermining CEDAW in Pakistan, urges the CEDAW Committee to ask the Government of Pakistan to explain what steps it has taken as a State Party to overcome the threats posed by the country's 'Talibanisation' on the one hand and the undermining of progress caused by perennial problems of ineffective governance and lack of ownership. Since Pakistan acceded to CEDAW in 1996, what is now being termed Talibanisation has grown unchecked to the point that it now challenges the very writ of the state. The government's response that "hinderances and difficulties [are] experienced mostly due to local customs and other cultural practices", (para 42) is unacceptable. The government cannot sidestep critical albeit difficult issues by referring to "customs, practices and misinterpretation of religion". Obligations under CEDAW bind States Parties to actively challenge and change such 'cultural practices;' the concept of 'due diligence' Article 4 (c) obligates the State to undertake measures to promote and protect the rights, safety and well-being of its citizens, including from violation by other citizens.
http://www.shirkatgah.org/CEDAW%20report%20(PDF%20format).pdf.
[Talibanisation and poor Governance.pdf]

A Taliban Resurgence:The Destabilization of Kabul
Not Specified
November 2007
Nefa Foundation
The date October 7, 2007 marked the sixth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Within only days of that invasion, the Islamic Emirate began to crumble and eventually dissolved. The Taliban were routed from much of the country, while most of the surviving Mullahs took refuge outside the country, primarily in neighbouring Pakistan. The time spent in exile across the border served to prune the movement’s ranks and select a hard core of loyal mujahideen who were ready to fight on and repel the infidels. Discerning truth from fiction is hard work in Afghanistan, and a handful of Afghans sitting around a fire waiting for the biting cold of the winter to give way constitutes a formidable myth-producing machine—without any further need for a structured propaganda effort. Legend relates how the Taliban insurgency was actually ignited by a group of Arabs and Chechens, Osama Bin Laden loyalists, who attacked a police post in Paktika in 2002, marking the beginning of a new, bloody conflict. After that first operation, there was no need for the foreign fighters to engage in battle that often; “Where Arabs go first, Afghans will follow suit.” Sadly, that seems to have been the case.
www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefatalibankabul1107.pdf
[Taliban resurgence.pdf]

Over Half of Afghanistan under Taliban Control
Not Specified
22 November, 2007
Spiegel Online
Six years ago coalition forces headed into Afghanistan to eradicate the Taliban. Now an international think tank says more than half of the country is under the Taliban's thumb. Meanwhile, an Oxfam report sharply criticized US-led development efforts in the region.
/www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,518937,00.html
[Think Tank Report Over Half of Afghanistan under Taliban Control - International - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News.mht]

Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact
Not Specified
29 January 2007
Crisis Group
While the growing insurgency is attracting increasing attention, long-term efforts to build the solid governmental institutions a stable Afghanistan requires are faltering. Following conclusion of the Bonn process, which created the country’s elected bodies, the Afghan government and the international community committed at the London Conference (31 January-1 February 2006) to the Afghanistan Compact, which identified “three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity” over five years: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and social and economic development. The government signed on to realising a “shared vision of the future” for a “stable and prosperous Afghanistan”, while over 60 nations and international institutions promised to provide the necessary resources and support. A year on, even those most closely associated with the process admit that the Compact has yet to have much impact. Afghans and internationals alike still need to demonstrate the political will to undertake deep-rooted institutional changes if the goals of this shared vision are to be met.
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b59_afghanistans_endangered_compact.pdf
[afghanistans endangered compact.pdf]

Kabul Lacks Capacity to Govern
Interviewee: Said Jawad, Interviewer: Robert McMahon
28 Feburary 2007
Council on Foreign Relations
Afghan and NATO forces are bracing for a major springtime offensive from the Taliban, which they expect to be fueled by a flow of weapons and gunmen from Pakistan. Afghanistan's ambassador to the United States, Said T. Jawad, praised recent U.S. pressure on Pakistan to conduct a crackdown on insurgents based in its territory. But he expressed deep concern about lagging reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, calling for improvements in the way international aid is delivered and projects like the civil-military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are carried out. “Unless we enhance the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and provide protection,” Jawad says, “just the military operation alone will not be successful.”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12739/
[Kabul Lacks Capacity to Govern - Council on Foreign Relations.mht]

Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations
Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend
10 May 07
The Terror Monitor
The opium economy in Afghanistan is a key component of the counter-insurgency campaign, yet remains one of the most difficult issues to tackle. It is a critical problem facing international efforts to create a functional government in Kabul that can prosecute counter-terrorism on its own territory. A successful counter narcotics intervention would have the added benefit of undermining an important terrorist funding source in arenas as diverse as Chechnya, Xinjiang and Central Asia. While coalition and Afghan officials regularly acknowledge the power that the narco-economy has over their ambitions, it has proven exceptionally challenging to turn this into a national strategy that incorporates counter narcotics into counter-insurgency and provides the resources for its execution.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4103
[Afghanistan drug trade and how it funds taliban operations.pdf]


The Afghanistan Compact
Not Specified
31 Jaunuary- 1 February 2006
unama-afg.org
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community: Determined to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of Afghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security; Affirming their shared commitment to continue, in the spirit of the Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin conferences, to work toward a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law, and to maintain and strengthen that commitment over the term of this Compact and beyond; Recognising the courage and determination of Afghans who, by defying violent extremism and hardship, have laid the foundations for a democratic, peaceful, pluralistic and prosperous state based on the principles of Islam; Noting the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement through the adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, and the holding of presidential elections in October 2004 and National Assembly and Provincial Council elections in September 2005, which have enabled Afghanistan to regain its rightful place in the international community; Mindful that Afghanistan's transition to peace and stability is not yet assured, and that strong international engagement will continue to be required to address remaining challenges; Resolved to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by setting conditions for sustainable economic growth and development; strengthening state institutions and civil society; removing remaining terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty; and meeting basic human needs; Have agreed to this Afghanistan Compact.
http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf[broken link]
[Afghanistan Compact.pdf]

Afghanistan, Education, and the Formation of Taliban
Leigh Nolan
January 2006
The Fletcher School
In the past half-century alone, Afghanistan has seen the collapse of its monarchy, the installation of a Soviet secular state, a successful Mujahideen insurgency to overthrow the Communist government, debilitating factionalization of Mujahideen clans, the precipitous rise and collapse of the Taliban government, and the installation of Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government in the wake of post 9/11 US intervention. Underlying these successive waves of conflict has been an ongoing struggle between secular and religious control of Afghanistan’s educational institutions. Control of the education system has been a mobilizing force for the conservative Islamist movement, the socialists, the overthrow of the Soviet government and the subsequent rise to power of the Taliban. This thesis will examine both the symbolic and the substantive role that the education system in Afghanistan has had in precipitating these successive waves of conflict with a particular focus on the madrassa system and its impact on the emergence of the Taliban.
http://fletcher.tufts.edu
[Afghanistan education and tehe formation of taliban.pdf]

War & Consequences: Global terrorism has increased since 9/11 attacks
Carl Conetta
25 September 2006
The Commonwealth Institute
Since the onset of the US “global war on terrorism”, the operational capacity of the original “Al Qaeda” centered around Osama bin-Laden has been significantly degraded. Hundreds of cadre formerly commanded by bin-Laden have been killed (mostly during the Afghan war). Several top leaders of the organization have been killed or captured – most notably Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – as have several leading regional associates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dozens of third tier operatives have been killed or captured. Nonetheless, the organization continues to function in a more decentralized form. Bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to provide guidance and encouragement to their followers, having issued 35 video and audio recordings from their redoubt in Pakistan. Since 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda has directed, financed, or played a role in 30 fatal operations in 12 countries causing 2500 casualties including 440 deaths. These figures, from the Rand-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, do not include the activities of al-Zarqawi in Iraq, nor do they include the activities of independent groups friendly to al-Qaeda.
http://www.comw.org/pda/0609bm38.html
[War and consequences global terrorism has increased since 9 11 attacks.pdf]

Our Seven Wars in Afghanistan:Progress Under the SWORD Model
Captain N. N. French
2006
cda-cdai.ca
The international community has taken on a task of great difficulty and incredible importance in Afghanistan. Its successful accomplishment is vital for the Afghan people and important to the international community as a whole. At the core of this task is a counterinsurgency war against a determined foe as part of a larger effort against global Islamist subversion. Numerous different sources offer their perspective as to our progress with respect to this task or give predictions as to the possible outcome, many are negative.2 Among these sources are the media, various military reports, organizations of the international community, academia, and many others. Some reports have looked atincreases in violent incidents and made their predictions, some focus on corruption, others have assessed the situation from the military perspective alone. Comparisons with counterinsurgencies from the past have been made as well. The media often employ “simplistic metrics” that give the impression that “the country is on the brink of failure.”3 The narrow approaches of others tend to be insufficient given the scope of the problem. Approaches that are wider in scope are seldom focused on the key elements.
http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2006/Our%20Seven%20Wars%20in%20Afghanistan%20-%20French.pdf.
[Our seven wars in Afghanistan.pdf]

The Resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan
Dr. Harsh V. Pant
25 September 2006
The Power and Interest News Report
Although Iraq has been the focus of U.S. foreign policy, the situation in Afghanistan, the original target of Washington's war on terrorism, continues to deteriorate. Some five years after the United States went to war to defeat the Taliban and three years after it declared an end to combat operations, the resurgence of the Taliban is haunting the U.S. military and its allies, and hopes for the emergence of a democratic Afghanistan are faltering. While the political institutions in the form of a constitution, a popularly-elected president, and a national parliament have been in place for some time now, their efficacy is increasingly being challenged by the rising violence and creeping fundamentalism. The present phase in violence is the most intense since the defeat of the Taliban in 2001.
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=559&language_id=1
[PINR - The Resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.mht]

Can Afghanistan be saved?
Not Specified
03 October 2006
FRONTLINE
The Taliban's comeback is clear. Its 2006 spring-summer offensive produced the most intense attacks in Afghanistan since the Taliban was overthrown five years ago. Here, experts discuss the complexities of the situation and why U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan are doomed unless the Taliban's sanctuary and support in Pakistan is ended. These excerpts are drawn from FRONTLINE's interviews.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/afghanistan.html
[FRONTLINE return of the taliban pakistan can afghanistan be saved PBS.mht]


Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Not Specified
19 December 2005
Government Of Afghanistan
The Government of Afghanistan’s model of governance and development today derives from an ancient concept of this region called the “Circle of Justice” (daira-yi’ idalat). As the ninth century Islamic scholar Ibn Qutayba,1 wrote:
afghanistan.org/documents/ANDS.pdf
[Afghanistan National Development strategy.pdf]

Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond
Barnett R. Rubin
April 2005
National Institute of International Relations
Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the US-led coalition and the inaugration of the Interim Authority based on the UN-meadiated Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001, Afghanistan has progressed aubstantially toward stability. Not all trends are positive, however. Afghanistan has become more dependent on narcotics production and trafficking than any country in the world. It remains one of the world's most impoverished and conflict-prone state, where only a substantial international presence prevents a return to war.
www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cru_paper_barnett.pdf
[Afghanistan 2005 and beyond.pdf]

Agonizing Issue: Is torture ever justified in military interrogations of terror suspects?
Interview with Charles Knight and Alfred P. Rubin
30 January 2005
The Commonwealth Institute
Accusations of torture and the highly publicized prison abuse in Iraq have cast a shadow over the US military's treatment of detainees. Harvard Law School is offering a spring semester course, "Torture, Law and Lawyers" on the ethics and legality of torture. This leads to a question: Can torture in military interrogations of terror suspects ever be justified? We asked Alfred Rubin, professor emeritus of international law at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and Charles Knight, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute in Cambridge, to address it.
http://www.comw.org/pda/0501cronin.html
[Combined Joint Task Force -82 - CJTF-82 - Hope of the Nation Reports the Taliban Falling Apart.mht]


The Taliban File Part IV - Mullah Omar Called Washington in 1998, New Documents Show
Not Specified
11 September 2004
National Security Archive
Washington, August 18, 2005 - UPDATE - The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan told a top Taliban official in September 2000 that the U.S. "was not out to destroy the Taliban," but the "UBL [Osama bin Laden] issue is supremely important," according to declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive. The documents, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, show how years of U.S. diplomacy with the Taliban, combined with pressure on Pakistan, and attempts to employ Saudi cooperation still failed to compel the Taliban to expel bin Laden.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/index.htm
[Mullah Omar Called Washington in 1998, New Documents Show.mht]

Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity
Sean M. Maloney
23 February 2004
CNET Networks
American policy in Afghanistan is at a crossroads, or so it appears. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested in May 2003 that the war on terror in Afghanistan was in “cleanup” or “mop up” phase.1 Overshadowed by the swift American military victory in Iraq, the images of airmobile troops and special operations forces rooting out al Qaeda in remote Afghanistan mountains took a back seat to images of M1A1 Abrams tanks sweeping through the desert destroying Iraq’s Republican Guard. Indeed, by the end of 2003, the problematic aspects of the American-led reconstruction effort in Iraq continued to dominate discourse. At the same time, critics darkly hinted that Afghanistan was “another Vietnam” when aspects of the ongoing but low-level Taliban terrorist activities popped up in the media in the fall of 2003. Those seeking to attack American reconstruction policy in Iraq point to Afghanistan and claim that it is somehow a failed prototype, that the credibility of the American reconstruction effort in Iraq is somehow linked to the credibility of the American-led effort in Afghanistan. These are dangerous and simplistic arguments.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_1_34/ai_115566393
[PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Spring 2004.mht]

Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan
Laurel Miller and Robert Perito
March 2004
USIP Library Resources
Two years into the process of re-building Afghanistan, and in the wake of the adoption of a new Constitution in January 2004, this report evaluates the progress that has—and has not—been made in establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan. The report assesses efforts by Afghan institutions and international donors to develop the apparatus of law enforcement and administration of justice necessary to ensure that the rights and protections guaranteed to Afghans in their new Constitution can be meaningfully implemented. Both the reform process and priorities are analyzed with respect to police, courts, judges and lawyers, law reform, legal education, and corrections. Key cross-cutting challenges to rule of law development, such as narcotics and organized crime, are also addressed. The report is based principally on approximately 70 interviews conducted by the authors in Kabul and Washington during October and November 2003. Interviewees included officials of the Afghan government, judiciary, and commissions created under the Bonn Agreement, the United Nations, the United States and other donor governments, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as independent observers.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.html
[Estabilihing the rule of law in afghanistan.pdf]

The Fall Of The Taliban Regime And Its Recovery As An Insurgent Movement In Afghanistan
Bakhtiyorjon U. Hammidov
2004
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
This thesis investigates the rapid defeat of the Taliban Regime by a US-led coalition and the ability of the Taliban to survive, reorganize, and form an insurgency movement. This thesis contends that there is an important set of interrelated social, cultural, religious, ethnic, tribal, historical, and geographic factors that must be considered to understand the current resurgence of the Taliban as an insurgency. The rationale for looking at these factors is to provide insight into the Taliban resurgence that can expose possible vulnerabilities that might be used to defeat the current insurgency. The main premise is that the insurgency cannot be divorced from its larger cultural context and that an understanding of the Taliban’s support base will yield solutions towards eroding that base of support.
http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA428904.pdf.
[The Fall of Taliban regime.pdf]

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
15 June 2004
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan is a fragile state that appears to be gradually stabilizing after more than 22 years of warfare, including a U.S.-led war that brought the current government to power. Before the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban began on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until its collapse in December 2001 at the hands of a U.S.-led military campaign. Since the defeat of the Taliban, Afghanistan no longer serves as a base of operations for Al Qaeda. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, about 2.5 million Afghan refugees have returned, and women have returned to schools, the workforce, and some participation in politics. Although with some difficulty, political reconstruction is following the route laid out by major Afghan factions and the international community during the U.S.-led war. A loya jirga (traditional Afghan assembly) adopted a new constitution on January 4, 2004, with some minor changes. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held by June 2004, although Afghan leaders now say the elections will be postponed until September 2004. At the same time, an ongoing insurgency by Taliban remnants, particularly in the Taliban’s former power base in the southeast, has created a perception of insecurity and slowed reconstruction. Other major problems include continued exercise of authority by regional leaders and growing trafficking in narcotics.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rl2.pdf.
[Afghanistan post war governance.pdf]


Who's Winning the War on Terror
Ahmed Rashid
5 September 2003
YaleGlobal
PESHAWAR AND GULANAI, PAKISTAN: From the dusty bazaar of these border towns bristling with guns and jihadi fighters, the lightning victory achieved by the Americans in the wake of the September 11 attack two years ago seems like a distant past. It's as if September 11 never happened and the Taliban were never routed. In the last ten days of August, the Taliban, who were driven out of Kabul under withering US bombardment and ground assault, assembled some 1,000 troops in the two tribal provinces of Afghanistan to launch attacks on US and Afghan forces. A mix of Pashtun tribal passion and Islamic extremism, combined with political failure in Pakistan, lies behind the Taliban resurgence and explains why the American war on terror is faltering.
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2384
[Who is winning the war on terror.htm]

Volume VII: The Taliban File
Sajit Gandhi
11 September 2003
The National Security Archive
Marking the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the National Security Archive at George Washington University today posted on the Web a new collection of recently declassified U.S. documents covering the controversial rise to power of Osama bin Laden's former hosts in Afghanistan, the Taliban. This murky history has particular relevance today, as the Taliban fighters regroup in Afghanistan, and key Taliban leaders remain at large. Today's posting, "The Taliban File," is the seventh volume in the Archive's September 11th Sourcebook series, recognized by the National Journal in December 2001 as one of the top five sites on the Web for terrorism information. The collection of 32 documents obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act by Archive research associate Sajit Gandhi details the rise of the Taliban from its meager start in Kandahar to a full fledged military force and ultimate control of the country. The documents discuss Pakistan's support for the Taliban, U.S. dealings with the Taliban, post 9/11 thinking on military strategy in the War on Terror, and the relationship between the assassination of the Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and the terrorist attacks of September 11.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index.htm
[The Taliban File.mht]

Unfinished Business in Afghanistan
Not Specified
April 2003
United States Institute of Peace
In comparison to the quick and successful U.S. military campaign to oust the Taliban, the political task of creating a stable and secure democratic state in Afghanistan is proving much more difficult. There are some hopeful signs since January 2003 with sections of President Hamid Karzai’s government apparatus becoming more functional. But the central government continues to be severely hampered in the absence of adequate funds, security structures, and infrastructure.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.html
[Unfinished business in afghanistan.pdf]

The Reconstruction of Afghanistan
Not Specified
12 February 2003
US Government
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, and Corzine. The Chairman. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. Today the committee meets to review the United States' policy toward Afghanistan and our ongoing efforts to assist that country in recovering from the damage incurred under the rule of the Taliban and former tenants, such as Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda. In the months ahead the United States will be focusing increased attention on threats posed by Iraq and North Korea, but we cannot abandon our commitments or lose sight of our goals in Afghanistan. The international community will take notice of our staying power in Afghanistan. If we are able to help Afghanistan transition into a secure democracy, we will bolster our ability to attract allies in the war against terrorism.
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate [server error]
[reconstruction of afghanistan.htm]

Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
27 August 2003
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan is a fragile state attempting, with substantial U.S. help, to stabilize after more than 22 years of warfare, including a U.S.-led war that brought the current government to power. Before the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban began on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until its collapse in December 2001 at the hands of the U.S.-led military campaign. The defeat of the Taliban enabled the United States and its coalition partners to send forces throughout Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and leaders that remain at large, including Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, about 2 million Afghan refugees have returned, and women have returned to schools, the workforce, and participation in politics. At the same time, there is a lack of security in many parts of Afghanistan, particularly the southeast, which was the power base of the Taliban. Security concerns are widely believed to be slowing the pace of reconstruction.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24047.pdf.

[Afghanistan current issues and US policy.pdf]
Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan
Kimberly Zisk Marten
Winter 2002-03
The Washington Quarterly.
The United States faces one overwhelming threat to its national security today: anarchy abroad. In lands where authority rests with whoever wins the latest battle and where outsiders come and go without any records kept, terrorists have an easier time concealing their presence and plotting their attacks. To maintain basic security throughout their countries, newly established governments in unstable societies need outside support so that their people can go about their daily business without fear of civil unrest.
http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_marten.pdf.
[Defending against Anarchy.pdf]


How Washington Funded the Taliban
Ted Galen Carpenter
02 August 2002
Cato Institute
The United States has made common cause with an assortment of dubious regimes around the world to wage the war on drugs. Perhaps the most shocking example was Washington's decision in May 2001 to financially reward Afghanistan's infamous Taliban government for its edict ordering a halt to the cultivation of opium poppies.
www.cato.org/dailys/08-02-02.html[timed out]
[How Washington Funded the Taliban.mht]

Who Is Responsible For The Taliban?
Michael Rubin
1 March 2002
Middle East Review of International Affairs
As the United States prepared for war against Afghanistan, some academics or journalists argued that Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida group and Afghanistan’s Taliban government were really creations of American policy run amok. A pervasive myth exists that the United States was complicit for allegedly training Usama bin Ladin and the Taliban. For example, Jeffrey Sommers, a professor in Georgia, has repeatedly claimed that the Taliban had turned on "their previous benefactor." David Gibbs, a political science professor at the University of Arizona, made similar claims. Robert Fisk, widely-read Middle East correspondent for The Independent, wrote of "CIA camps in which the Americans once trained Mr. bin Ladin’s fellow guerrillas." Associated Press writer Mort Rosenblum declared that "Usama bin Ladin…was the type of Soviet-hating freedom fighter that U.S. officials applauded when the world looked a little different."In fact, neither bin Ladin nor Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Umar were direct products of the CIA. The roots of the Afghan civil war and the country’s subsequent transformation into a safe-haven for the world’s most destructive terror network is a far more complex story, one that begins in the decades prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/jv6n1a1.html
[WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TALIBAN.mht]

The Enron-Cheney-Taliban Connection?
Ron Callari, Albion Monitor
28 February 2002
alternet.org
Enron is a scandal so enormous that it's hard to wrap your mind around it. Not just a single financial disaster, it's actually a jigsaw of interlocking scandals, each outrageous in its own right.There's Enron the Wall St. con game, where company bookkeepers used sleight of hand to turn four years of steady losses into stunning profits. There's Enron the reverse Robin Hood, which stole from its own employees even as its executives were hauling millions of dollars out the backdoor. There's Enron's Ken Lay the Kingmaker, who used the corporation's fraudulent wealth to broker elections and skew public policy to his liking. And then there are the Enron coverups, as documents are shredded and the White House seeks to conceal details about meetings between Enron and Vice President Cheney.
http://www.alternet.org/story/12525/
[AlterNet The Enron-Cheney-Taliban Connection.mht]

Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war
Carl von Clausewitz
30 January 2002
The Commonwealth Institute
It is routine for war retrospectives to ask how victory was achieved. But Operation Enduring Freedom poses an additional, more fundamental question: Where has victory delivered us? In two short months Operation Enduring Freedom transformed the strategic landscape of not only Afghanistan, but also Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. It did so in ways that were largely unforseen and unplanned at the outset of the war and that remain unsettled today. Indeed, seldom has the gap been so great between the clarity of battlefield victory and the uncertainty of what it has wrought. Even the net effect of the victory on the new terrorism is uncertain. The Taliban have been driven from power and Al Qaeda has been scattered to the hills, but Afghanistan has not come to rest in a stable place. In some respects its new circumstances resemble those of 1992, when a fragile peace brokered by outside powers was about to be tested. In other respects, its situation is reminiscent of the 1970s, when Soviet influence in the country was peaking and a new round in the “Great Game” was about to begin. Concomitant with the war in Afghanistan, the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and between India and Pakistan also escalated dramatically. Taken together, these developments may portend a period of increased global conflict deeply involving the United States and significantly exceeding the issue of terrorism.
www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.html
[Strange Victory A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war -- Project on Defense Alternatives.mht]

Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State
Richard P. Cronin
10 May 2002
Congressional Research Service
The U.S.-led effort to end Afghanistan’s role as host to Osama bin Laden and other anti-western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could continue to be a potential base for terrorism and a source of regional instability. An important beginning was made with the December 22, 2001, installation of a multi-ethnic interim Afghan administration under Hami Karzai, following U.N.-sponsored negotiations in Bonn, Germany. An ethnic Pushtun with ties to the former royal family, Karzai has gained the nominal support of major regional warlords, but his leadership remains dangerously dependent on his status as a compromise figure. who can attract foreign assistance while not posing a threat to the warlords and other armed contenders for power. Moreover, the viability of the process set in motion in Bonn has yet to be established, especially the outcome of an Emergency Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) which is to appoint a Transitional Authority in June 2002, with the task of drafting a new constitution, and the holding of national elections by about December 2003.
http://209.85.175.104/search?q=cache:mDTl5KPB6_sJ:fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10093.pdf+Afghanistan+challenges+and+options&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1
Afghanistan challenges and options.pdf

Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army
Ali A. Jalali
19 August 2002
Army War College
In May 2002, American Green Berets began training the first group of Afghan soldiers for the new Afghan National Army (ANA). This complex mission will take years to accomplish, yet it is expected to contribute greatly to the return of peace and normalcy to Afghanistan. The United States, the main sponsor of the effort, sees the project as an effective alternative to the expansion of international security forces to police the war-devastated country. Further, the United States expects that the ANA will aid in the multilateral struggle against terrorist activity in the region. This is the fourth time in 150 years of Afghanistan’s turbulent history that the country is recreating the state military following its total disintegration caused by foreign invasions or civil wars.1 The process of rebuilding has always been influenced by the prevailing political and social conditions in the country. The current attempt is not going to be an exception. The profound social transformation of Afghanistan during more than two decades of a devastating war has drastically changed the traditional political and social landscape of Afghanistan. The rebuilding of a national army will have to be intertwined with the creation of a legitimate broad-based government, economic reconstruction, and the demobilization process.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-91564616.html
[PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Autumn 2002.mht]


The Political Future Of Afghanistan
Not Specified
6 December 2001
US Government
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (chairman of the committee) presiding.Present: Senators Biden, Wellstone, Boxer, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen and Enzi. The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I say to the witnesses, both panels, that the Senate schedule is obviously going to intervene and interfere, as it usually does here.We have two very distinguished panels of witnesses, the first representing the administration and then a second panel. We are going to, I am told, although I never believe it until it happens, have two to three successive votes beginning at 11 o'clock, which if that were the case we would have to recess for probably 20 minutes in order to be able to get those votes in. But sometimes they announce that and it does not occur, as I know Richard and Christina know, having worked here and know this place.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:77065.wais
[The political future of afghanistan.htm]

The Taliban and Afghanistan
Tony Karon
18 September 2001
Time Inc
The Taliban, who overran most of Afghanistan in 1996, are a militia driven by an extremely harsh Medieval interpretation of Sunni Islam. Backed by Pakistan and funded by Saudi Arabia, they promised to put an end to the factional warfare that had claimed thousands of lives in the years following the defeat of the country's Soviet puppet government in 1991. The Taliban imposed an extremely repressive, sectarian Islamic regime on the Afghan people, barring women from work and education and even killing Shiite Muslims of the Hazari minority. Bin Laden had been a hero of the 'jihad' against the Soviet occupiers, and the Taliban welcomed him back to Afghanistan in 1996 after his expulsion from the Sudan. Bin Laden has reportedly cemented his ties to the Taliban leadership through his daughter's marriage to its leader, Mullah Omar. But more importantly, his "Arab Afghan" fighters have played a leading role in the Taliban's ongoing military campaign against its opponents. The Taliban's elite brigade were trained in Bin Laden's camps, and are believed to be loyal to the Saudi terrorist's "Al Qaida" movement.
link: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175372,00.html
[TIME_com Primer The Taliban and Afghanistan -- Printout -- TIME.mht]

Beyond bin Laden: The Temptations of a Wider War
Carl Conetta
28 September 2001
Commonwealth Institute
The United States can strike hard at bin Laden both inside and outside Afghanistan without pursuing a broader war in Afghanistan or trying to topple the Taliban by force. Expanding the scope of military action beyond the al Qaeda network should be avoided for three reasons: First, it would detract from the primary objectives: to bring the perpetrators of the 11 September attack to justice and disable their organization. Second, it would undermine international cooperation against terrorism. And, third, it risks a broader calamity: the destabilization of central, south, and southwest Asia. An alternative to broader war scenarios would be a smaller-scale (but longer-term) effort against the bin-Laden network in Afghanistan -- principally involving the use of special operations units reinforced by other assets. More important for longer-term success against terrorism is improved multinational cooperation in intelligence gathering and law enforcement. A separate effort is needed to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. This should involve all the interested actors in the region and emphasize non-military measures. Reliable progress in stabilizing Afghanistan may also require some regional confidence- and security-building measures. What the region does not require under any circumstances, however, is an increase in arms transfers.
http://www.comw.org/pda/0109bm22.html
[Beyond bin Laden The Temptations of a Wider War -- Project on Defense Alternatives.mht]


Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State
Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman
Winter 2000
The Washington Quarterly.
Afghanistan has gone from one of Washington’s greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its most profound failures. During the Cold War, U.S. support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance resulted in a debacle for Moscow, humiliating the vaunted Red Army and discrediting the Soviets throughout the Muslim world. After the Soviets withdrew, however, Afghanistan has become a disaster for U.S. policy. The master terrorist ‘Usama bin Laden has taken shelter in Afghanistan, using it as a base to indoctrinate and train militants who strike at the United States and its allies. Afghan women face a horrifying array of restrictions, among the most repressive in the world. The country is now the world’s leading producer of opium, which in turn is used to produce heroin. These problems, however, are only symptoms of a more dangerous disease. Though policymakers are loathe to say it openly, Afghanistan is ruled by a rogue regime, the Taliban.The outrages that draw headlines in the West stem from its misrule and will continue as long as the movement dominates Afghanistan. If anything, the danger is growing. “Talibanism”—a radical, backward, and repressive version of Islam similar to the Saudi “Wahhabi” credo but rejected by the vast majority of Muslims worldwide—is gaining adherents outside Afghanistan and spreading to other countries in the region.
http://www.twq.com/winter00/231Byman.pdf.
[Afghanistan the consolidation of a rogue state.pdf]

Global Terrorism: South Asia—The New Locus
Not Specified
12 July 2000
US Government
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Chairman Gilman. I am pleased to call to order today's hearing on global terrorism. In particular, we will focus on the most recent shift in the patterns of international terrorism to South Asia. This move away from the more traditional Middle East-based terrorist activity clearly deserves our attention and careful policy analysis. Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the shift of the center of gravity for international terrorism has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-1980's, the Administration publishes a report called Patterns of Global Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the public with the latest trends and developments in international terrorism. The report for 1999 establishes that South Asia is the new locus of international terrorism, presenting both a regional threat and a growing threat to our nation. We will examine what this new trend means for our nation. Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master terrorists like Usama bin Laden and his radical supporters. We have on display today the State Department's wanted posters for bin Laden, offering a $5 million reward for his capture. Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban to its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east, also contributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new locus of international terrorism.
http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/106h/68482.pdf. [Broken Link]
[Global terrorism South Asia the new locus.htm]

The Taliban: Engagement Or Confrontation
Not Specified
20 July 2000
US Government
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback presiding. Present: Senators Brownback and Boxer. Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all for joining us today. Thank you, very much, Senator Boxer, for being with us as well. Secretary Inderfurth, thank you as well for returning to testify before the committee. We are glad to have you here for yet another review on Afghanistan. I wish I could say I thought that there had been some movement in U.S. policy. In fact, though it does not appear as
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
[Taliban engagement or confrontation.htm]

The Taliban: Exporting Extremism
Ahmed Rashid
December 1999
Foreign Affairs
"Talibanization," the destabilizing export of Afghan-style radical Islam, may be a new term in the American political lexicon. But in Central and South Asia, where the repercussion of the superstrict Taliban rule of Afghanistan have been widely felt, the word has become all too familiar. As political fragmentation, economic meltdown, ethnic and sectarian warfare, and Islamic fundamentalism tighten their grip on Pakistan and much of the rest of the region, the dangerous behavior of Afghanistan's new leaders is no longer a local affair. More and more, chaos in Afghanistan is seeping through its porous borders. The ongoing civil war has polarized the region, with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backing the Taliban regime while Iran, Russia, India, and four former Soviet Central Asian republics support the opposition Northern Alliance. The confrontation is producing enormous economic disruption throughout the area, as the Afghan warlords' dependence on smuggling and drug trafficking grows insatiable.
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/think_tank/taliban_extremism_fa_nov_99.htm
[The Taliban Exporting Extremism.mht]

Veiled In Fear
Not Specified
9 October 1996
MacNeil/Lehrer Productions
Afghanistan's new rulers are called the Taliban, and they've begun to enforce a strict Islamic social code which, among other things, severely limits women's activities. The decrees are so harsh that even Iran's rulers have criticized the Afghan rulers. And the U.N. Secretary-General has warned he might stop all U.N. programs there. The Taliban have taken over a country wracked by nearly 20 years of internal conflict and civil war, including military occupation by the Soviet army from 1979 to ‘89. We start with a report from Afghanistan by Mark Austin of Independent Television News.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec96/afghan_background_10-9.html
[Online NewsHour Afghanistan -- Veiled in Fear -- October 9, 1996.mht]