Why Three Tests?
Having shown that India is capable of exploding thermo-nuclear devices has been just one of the many aims. There are many others. The most basic need was to demonstrate that India has been the technology to repeat the 1974 nuclear experiment, produce a low-yield device that would be of tactical use and also deploy a high-yield thermo-nuclear device. For Indian scientists it`s not the explosions themselves but the raw data that emanates which is of considerable excitement. Indians have long discovered that the good old partial differential equations can be used for mapping spatial as well as temporal behaviour of materials as well as processes. Parallel computing algorithms have also shown that given sufficient computing power and designing of ultra fast data buses on computers, it is possible to emulate in real time entire ranges of physical phenomena. The problem hitherto has been the lack of raw data. It took a few seconds to gather invaluable data for two aspects of the three explosions - one, the behaviour of the detonating mechanisms and the behaviour of the nuclear material. This data will fuel work for thousands of man days of lab work. It will also obviate once and for all the need for similar tests. India can therefore go ahead and sign the CTBT. These same classes of nuclear weapons need not be tested on Indian soil again.
Clincher: US Reaction to Ghauri
To test or not to test has always been the big question. The clincher was US President Bill Clinton`s delayed reaction to the Pakistani Ghauri missile test when he said that Pakistan was justified in taking any steps to ensure its national security. This was just the signal India had been waiting for. A test could now be justified on grounds of national security. The Indian defence minister, George Fernandes, was not acting as a loose cannon when he talked about China being India`s principal threat. He was simply articulating a continuing concern of Indian security analysts.
Pakistan has, in fact, slipped down in India`s threat perceptions. But Kashmir remains a concern. The conventional Pakistani military machine is run down, including its air force and will not be able to fight a sustained war of 14-days-plus. The Pakistan Air Force in particular will be able to fight coherently for six days if they wish to keep their F-16 assets intact. Thus Pakistan does not want total war with India but at the same time wants to keep open its option for limited war in Kashmir. Just how resolute Pakistan is in keeping the Kashmir war option open became evident following the announcement of the 1500 km Ghauri ballistic missile being tested. Pakistan was determined to keep its option of a limited war in Kashmir open by any means including bluff. This set in motion a trail of thinking that led to the three peaceful nuclear explosions of 11 May, 1998.
One of the first conclusions was that Pakistan through sheer bluff could attempt to rule out the conventional war option. Second, Pakistan would then try to launch a mini invasion in Kashmir as in 1965, grab a chunk of territory and call in the world for mediation. It was a lose-lose scenario for India.
More important perhaps was the necessity to end ambiguities regarding nuclear/missile capabilities. While the Ghauri test was never carried out, there are credible reports to suggest that Pakistan has long distance missiles procured from China (and not North Korea) that could be armed with uranium fission devices. Pakistan needed to be told in no uncertain terms that while it had every right to take steps to ensure its security it must know the peril of endangering another`s security.
The Future
India now has been locked on to a course which no government can reverse. Scientists and the military policy planning establishment have kept their silence for far too long. Anybody in the future trying to derail the move to develop command and control systems, satellite imagery capabilities and terminal guidance capabilities would be exposed. India, in short, is committed to following the path to full nuclear capability, albeit of a low order. The aim is regional security and not global dominance. India shares with other great democracies the desire to contain the nuclear arms race and prevent global proliferation. It has gone nuclear not because of any sense of misplaced national pride but because of its security environment. India lives in a dangerous neighbourhood and must make it amply clear to the powers in the immediate vicinity that any arms race is futile because it continuously risks escalation. India fully appreciates its neighbours` steps to ensure their own security. Having said this, India has also sent out the signal that all forms of warfare or the quest for military solutions in the subcontinent will not work. In this quest, India needs to be partnered by other great democracies who believe that force can never be the ultimate arbiter of geo-politics and history.