Pakistani advertisements for supply of nuclear grade material to international customers have caused serious concern in the media. Though officials have denied the reports, analysts feel that the whole drama appear to be a deliberate Pakistani ploy to first alarm the international community with a display of its supposedly existent nuclear muscle, and next, to impress the community with its promises to behave like a responsible nuclear supplier, even though not bound by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Does Pakistan really possess the muscle required for making nuclear supplies in the international marketplace? How credible is its competence in the basic nuclear technologies? The answers to these questions become evident when one examines some facts related to its nuclear power programme. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is in charge of Pakistan`s nuclear programme and is currently running two nuclear power reactors, Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP). KANUPP is a 137 MWe pressure tube type heavy water reactor of CANDU type. KANUPP was a turn-key project awarded to Canadian General Electric for design, supply, construction and commissioning of the plant. Pakistan had no input in designing or building KANUPP. Essentially all manufactured equipment was imported. This plant was commissioned in 1971. As a reaction to Indian nuclear test of 1974, Canada announced a new nuclear policy restricting support only to states which were either signatory to NPT or accepted full-scope safeguards on their nuclear complexes. Since Pakistan refused to accept the Canadian conditions, support to Pakistan was cut off in December 1976. This affected supplies of fuel, spare parts and technical assistance to KANUPP. The operation of KANUPP was abruptly halted as Pakistan had not developed a bare minimum domestic capability to support the operation of its prized possession. Pakistan kept searching for avenues of purchase of a fuel fabrication plant, and finally succeeded in starting fabrication of fuel for KANUPP, five years later.

In India, the operation of RAPS-1 continued uninterrupted with the help of the domestic infrastructure already in place. RAPS-2, which was half finished when the Canadian support was suddenly withdrawn, was completed with indigenous efforts and the reactor started commercial operation in November 1980. In Pakistan, the capability to construct its own nuclear reactor, does not exist even today. Since 1981 Pakistan has struggled very hard to keep KANUPP working. Safety problems at KANUPP and PAEC`s inability to deal with them came to the fore when it had to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for help to deal with some problems concerning the reactor`s coolant channels. An IAEA-ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team) mission made several critical observations regarding the safety processes in the Pakistani plant. Based on its recommendations Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) was asked to complete a series of inspections on eight coolant channels . This exercise cost Pakistan a huge sum, in terms of money as well as prestige. In contrast, India developed capabilities to inspect, refurbish, and replace coolant channels of its reactors on a routine basis. Hundreds of such channels have been managed in this manner so far, without any external assistance. Unlike India, Pakistan failed to learn a lesson f rom the Canadian withdrawal of support, and made few, if any, efforts to develop self-reliance in areas of nuclear technology essential for safe operation of their reactor. PAEC seems to have recognised the limitations of its capability to safely manage KANUPP.

In 1989, Pakistan joined the CANDU Owners Group (COG). COG then signed a deal with PAEC for the project "Safe Operation of KANUPP". The scope of the project suggested the range of areas where PAEC needed help. These included physical inspection of the plant, as well as safety analysis of the original design using current techniques and standards and a radiological protection audit at KANUPP. It was against this background that, in 1992 Canada`s nuclear regulatory agency, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), considered safety issues at KANUPP. Based on an IAEA report sent to the Government of Canada which lists improvements needed to bring KANUPP to an acceptable standard of safety, AECB has recorded that it questioned the continued operation of the reactor given the apparently serious safety problems. It even concluded that KANUPP`s continued operation is imprudent. Circumstances surrounding Pakistan`s acquisition of the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP) are bizarre. Having failed to procure a second nuclear reactor form western vendors, who abided by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) regulations, Pakistan struck a deal with China, a novice in the nuclear power technology, for the purchase of a Chinese home-made reactor of unproven design. Under this deal, China, unlike western vendors, did not insist on full-scope safeguards on Pakistan`s nuclear complexes. CHASNUPP, supplied to Pakistan on a turn-key basis, is a 300 MWe Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) based on the Qinshan-1 reactor, which is often described in Pakistan and China as an indigenous Chinese reactor. The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is the supplier of the CHASNUPP. The first concrete was poured at Chashma in August 1993. The reactor was scheduled to begin commercial operation by the end of August 2000.

China`s experience with Qinshan-1, the reactor on which CHASNUPP is based, has been riddled with problems and delays. Part of the problem might has been the attempt to integrate locally made components with imported components from a diverse range of international suppliers. The problems did not cease even when the reactor was commissioned. The reactor was closed for several months amid reports of teething trouble. The biggest problem was unearthed in July 1998 when, in a routine refuelling outage, it was discovered that several dozen in-core instrumentation tube guides had ruptured apparently from vibrations, sending debris into the reactor vessel. These instrumentation tube guides allow instruments of various kinds to enter the reactor vessel from the bottom. These pipes had been bolted in place, rather than the normal practice of welding them, and bolts on 24 out of the 30 pipes had been shaken loose by vibrations leading to 9 of the 121 fuel assemblies being damaged releasing radioactive material in the coolant. The limited experience of the Chinese nuclear industry was made evident when international nuclear engineering companies were asked to assess the event, propose solutions and undertake repairs. Eventually the contract was awarded to Westinghouse. The contract with Westinghouse for repairs at Qinshan-1 required the design, analysis, fabrication and installation of replacement components with improvements to facilitate their survival for the remaining 20 year design life. CNNC then suggested its engineers would modify CHASNUPP, then nearing completion of its construction, to take care of the problem. It now seems clear that an accident at CHASNUPP, certainly beyond PAEC`s capability, might be beyond the capabilities of Chinese suppliers.

Based on these facts, an independent review of Chashma design was carried out by an IAEA design and safety review mission. The mission made several recommendation for further improvements. This suggests that both Shanghai Nuclear Research and Development Institute (SNERDI - one of the organisations working for CNNC and responsible for design) and PAEC had failed to identify some of the problems with the safety analysis and design of CHASNUPP. Design and manufacturing issues are further complicated by the fact that, initially CNNC had tried to procure components for CHASNUPP from foreign vendors. It was only when they refused, on grounds of Pakistan`s refusal to sign NPT or allow full-scope safeguards, that it took up the task of manufacturing. This has been the first time that China has manufactured such components. The reliability of their integrity and performance will be highly suspect.

A recent study conducted at Princeton University gives elaborate details of safety issues related to CHASNUPP. These issues include the seismicity of the Chashma site, inadequacy of accident analysis studies for CHASNUPP, the reactor`s location on the banks of Indus, radioactive releases in case of an accident, and so on. The report points out that the designers of Qinshan-1 may not have fully understood the effect of the coolant flow on the core, pressure vessel and the associated components of the. reactor. The components in Qinshan-1 had failed because they were inadequately designed for their normal operating requirements. The problem faced at Qinshan-1, was a problem correctable at source by design change, and any experience designer would have foreseen the problem. The same inexperienced designers were in charge of CHASNUPP.

This observation is compounded by the fact that the ability of China in the field of manufacturing, technology, quality control and production management of nuclear reactor equipment is suspect. In brief, CHASNUPP epitomises the dangerous combination of an inexperienced vendor supplying nuclear technology to an incompetent buyer, incapable of understanding the technical issues implied by such a purchase. Safety of this reactor will remain a matter of global concern. Pakistan is heavily dependent on imported oil and natural gas, unsustainable in the medium to long term, for meeting its electricity needs. This internal compulsion pushes it towards nuclear energy as an attractive option for its energy security. However, its lack of self-reliance in the field of nuclear technology has thwarted the growth of its nuclear power programme in the post-NPT era. More than 28 years after acquisition of its first nuclear power reactor, Pakistan`s capabilities to design, manufacture and construct nuclear reactors have remained practically non-existent. It does not seem to have any significant indigenous strength to address minor technical issues, which are bound to arise in the operation of any nuclear reactor. This reveals a shallow Pakistani nuclear industry which, at present, is able to support itself in some manner with the help of crutches from China, and some alarmed international agencies. Such a lame nuclear industry, which cannot support the requirements of its own country cannot, by any stretch of imagination, qualify to call itself a nuclear supplier.