One has to analyse the recent meeting of Mr.Erik Solheim, the Norwegian intermediary, with Prabakaran, the leader of the LTTE, in the LTTE-controlled Wanni area of Sri Lanka on November 1 and the speech of Prabakaran on the LTTE`s Heroes` Day on November 27,2000, against the background of the prevailing ground situation, marked by the following features:

• The post-June strengthening of the capability of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces through the acquisition of aircraft from Israel, multi-barrel guns from Pakistan and other equipment from other countries has not only enabled it to thwart any LTTE attempt to re-capture Jaffna, but also to make some minor tactical gains in the form of re-capture of some lost territory from the LTTE`s control. The shaken morale of the Armed Forces has been restored. But, even these new acquisitions have not enabled the Armed Forces to roll back the LTTE from the territory occupied by it pre-July.
• Apart from hit and run raids on the ground and in the sea and suicide attacks on individual targets, the LTTE has not been able to mount any major offensive against the Armed Forces, partly due to manpower shortage and partly due to depletion of its anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles. The reported tightening of security measures by countries such as Thailand, Greece etc to prevent LTTE gun-running and the closer surveillance of ships owned by the LTTE by Western narcotics control agencies because of the suspicion of their involvement in narcotics smuggling at the instance of Pakistani heroin smugglers have created difficulties for the LTTE in replenishing its stocks. Unable to face the air strikes from the Sri Lankan Air Force, the only alternative for the LTTE to neutralise the former`s new capability is to destroy the aircraft on the ground through hit and run raids on the Air Force bases. While the LTTE has repeatedly demonstrated a capability for such raids on Sri Lankan Naval establishments, it has not been able to organise such raids on the Air Force bases, presumably because of tighter ground security in the Air Force.

The resulting stalemate on the ground has been accompanied by the following developments at the political/diplomatic levels, which could be detrimental to the LTTE`s objectives:

• The repeated diplomatic pressure from Colombo has made the UK and other West European countries as well as non-European countries such as Greece, South Africa, Myanmar and Thailand more responsive to Colombo`s concerns over the misuse of their territory by the LTTE for political and terrorism-related activities directed against the Government and State of Sri Lanka with which they have cordial diplomatic relations and more willing, than in the past, to consider action against such activities.
• West Europe-based non-Governmental and Church Organisations, which in the past intervened with the Governments of their countries to advise against any action against the LTTE front organisations operating from their territory, are increasingly embarrassed by reports of the LTTE`s use of children in its operations against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, exploitation of the emotions of women to persuade them to undertake suicide missions and involvement in narcotics smuggling. They are, therefore, increasingly reticent to intervene energetically on behalf of the LTTE front organisations. The LTTE is under pressure from these organisations to project a more reasonable face of itself.

The picture of greater reasonableness projected by the LTTE in recent weeks has been the result of these developments. The indications till now are that it is purely a tactical ploy and there is no credible evidence of any major change in its strategic objective of an independent Eelam. In the past, Prabakaran had reportedly been telling his followers that he would be betraying the memory of the hundreds of young boys and girls who willingly embraced death in the cause of Tamil Eelam, if he compromised on this issue and agreed to a solution, offering the Tamils less than independence. He had also been telling them that if a situation arose making Tamil Eelam impossible, he would rather bite his cyanide capsule than compromise on this objective and that his successors would be free to accept a compromise. However, there have recently been some reports indicating that he might now be willing to consider an "one country, two nations, two cultures, two systems and two armies" formula, under which Sri Lanka would remain one country on paper, with a Tamil Eelam genuinely autonomous with its own political system and army (the LTTE converted into its army) forming a proforma part of it, but these reports have not been corroborated.

Despite the stalling of the LTTE`s offensive against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the difficulties faced by it at the international level, it would be unwise to underestimate the continued determination of Prabakaran and the motivation of his cadres to achieve the LTTE`s strategic objective. The LTTE has been thwarted by the Armed Forces for the time being, but not vanquished. So long as this determination and motivation remain strong, the Sri Lankan military would have little chance of overwhelming the LTTE on the ground, whatever be its new acquisitions and whatever be the difficulties of the LTTE. Colombo has, therefore, no other alternative but to resume vigorously its search for a political solution based on imaginative new approaches, which would satisfy the pride of the Tamils and give them the satisfaction of being masters of their own destiny, while, at the same time, not hurting the pride of the Sinhalese and damaging the unity of Sri Lanka.

Prabakaran has never been averse to a political approach, provided the political dialogue is preceded by the following steps of de-escalation:

• Mutual cessation of offensive operations.
• Withdrawal of the Sri Lankan military into the barracks in Jaffna in order to restore the hurt pride of the Tamils, with a prior commitment by the LTTE not to take advantage of the withdrawal for re-occupying Jaffna.
• Lifting of the economic embargoes imposed by Colombo on the Tamil population supporting the LTTE.

There are no indications that he is prepared to relent on these conditions. The references in the statements issued by the LTTE after Mr.Solheim`s meeting with Prabakaran and in the latter`s Heroes` Day speech to the LTTE`s willingness for "unconditional talks" and the simultaneous reiteration of its insistence on prior de-escalation have caused some confusion among analysts as to the real purport of these statements and speech. Thus, the statement issued by the London-based International Secretariat of the LTTE on Prabakaran`s meeting with Mr.Solheim said: "Explaining the politico-military situation in the North-east, Mr.Pirapaharan blamed the Kumaratunga Government for having unleashed a genocidal war against the Tamil people and, as a consequence, the Tamils had suffered enormously. He declared that the Government was not sincere in seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but escalating war of aggression against the Tamils. Discussing about the prospects for peace talks, the LTTE leader suggested a process of de-escalation of the conflict as a necessary pre-requisite for a dialogue. By de-escalation, Mr. Pirapaharan meant the cessation of armed hostilities, the removal of military aggression and occupation, the withdrawal of the economic embargo and the creation of conditions of normalcy in the Tamil homeland. The LTTE leader also insisted that the Sri Lanka Government should take the initiative of relaxing the conditions of war if they wanted genuine peace. Both the parties discussed several pertinent issues and the discussions were cordial and constructive."

The relevant sections from Prabakaran`s speech are cited below:

• "If a permanent political solution is to be achieved by peaceful means, the Sinhala nation has to accept certain basic truths about the Tamil people and understand their basic aspirations. The Tamils of Eelam have a unique ethnic identity. They are a community of people constituted as a national formation experiencing a national consciousness of their own. They have their own lands; a historically constituted territory which is their homeland. Our people desire only one thing. They want to live happily in peace in their own lands without being dominated or harassed by others. The deepest aspiration of our people is to live in dignity in a political environment where they could rule themselves. The Sinhalese should try to understand the Tamil aspirations. It is on the basis of this understanding that a just and permanent solution could be built up."
• "If the Sinhala nation fails to redeem itself from the grip of racism and continues its repression against the Tamils, we have no alternative other than to secede and form an independent Tamil State".
• "Jaffna does not belong to the Sinhala nation. Jaffna belongs to the people of Jaffna. Sovereignty is not a divine right of a State.Sovereignty derives from the people; it is an inalienable right of a people. It is the people of Jaffna who has sovereign right over the Jaffna peninsula. The Sinhala nation cannot impose its sovereignty over the historically constituted lands of the Tamils by military aggression and occupation. As the liberation army of our people, we will not allow our traditional lands to be occupied by alien forces. Whatever the challenges we have to face, regardless of the obstacles we must overcome, whichever force opposes us, our liberation movement is determined to liberate Jaffna".
• "If the Government takes the initiative, we will respond positively. Our liberation organisation is prepared to participate in negotiations to find a political solution to the ethnic conflict through peaceful means. We are not opposed to peaceful processes of resolving conflicts. Nor are we reluctant to engage in peaceful dialogue. We are seeking a negotiated settlement that would be fair, just, and equitable and that would satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people. I explained this position very clearly when I met the Norwegian peace delegates in Wanni recently. We are not imposing any pre-conditions for peace talks. Yet, we insist on the creation of a cordial atmosphere and conditions of normalcy conducive for peace negotiations. It is practically difficult for both the parties who have been involved in a savage and bloody war for the last two decades with mutual animosity and distrust to suddenly enter into a peace process, while continuing hostilities. It is precisely for this reason we propose a process of de-escalation of war leading to cessation of armed hostilities and the creation of a peaceful, cordial environment".
• "Our call for de-escalation and normalisation of civilian life should not be misinterpreted as pre-conditions. We want the talks to proceed from a stable foundation in a cordial atmosphere of mutual trust so that it could turn out to be a constructive engagement".

It is apparent from a careful reading that when they mention their willingness for unconditional talks, they mean talks without political pre-conditions such as the talks being held within the parameters of the new devolution proposals worked out by the Government, but their insistence on prior military de-escalation remains.

Mr.Solheim has, however, avoided using the word pre-conditions while describing his talks with Prabakaran to Colombo pressmen on November 2. He said: " The talks were serious, frank, open and we consider them very useful. We consider Mr.Prabakaran as serious and dedicated (to a negotiated settlement). He did not set any pre-conditions, but we discussed how the initial phase could come about and what measures could be taken by the different parties to build such a trust that peace talks are possible."

During a subsequent visit to New Delhi in the third week of November, Mr.Solheim spoke of "simultaneous and reciprocal actions by the two sides" to create a conducive atmosphere for a dialogue. It has been reported that he has put forward a step-by-step de-escalation proposal under which, as a first step, Colombo would remove the economic embargoes in return for the LTTE`s release of the Sri Lankan security forces personnel detained by it. Even in the event of the two sides agreeing to this, it is doubtful if the Sri Lankan Army would agree to a cessation of its operations against the LTTE and the withdrawal of its troops in Jaffna to the barracks. The responses from different sections of the Sri Lankan political and military leadership to the November developments have been marked by a calculated lack of enthusiasm.

Maj.Gen.Lionel Ballagalle, the Army chief, told the Foreign Correspondents` Association of Colombo on November 11: " We should not stop fighting until we come to an agreement (on the resolution of the conflict). Suspicion remains in our minds (about the LTTE`s intentions). It is up to him (Prabakaran) to convince us."

Mr.Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, the Prime Minister, told the "Sunday Island" newspaper on November 22: " We will not welcome terrorists being brought forward by anybody to the conference table with conditions. But if the terrorists are prepared to give up terrorism and come into the political mainstream, then, of course, it is a different scenario altogether."

While the President, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga, has refrained from commenting substantively on the Solheim-Prabakaran talks, Mr.Lakshman Kadirgamar, her Foreign Minister, who is believed to reflect her views, said in an interview on November 18: " If those are the conditions, they are totally unacceptable and there will be no movement whatsoever….. In theory, if talks begin, one should be able to talk about all kinds of possibilities, except, on our side,one thing is completely ruled out. We will not open any kind of discussion on a separate State. All talks must be short of that."

While the Government has refrained from reacting substantively to Prabakaran`s speech, Prime Minister Wickramanayake has hinted in an interview that if the LTTE agreed to give up terrorism and enter the peace process, he would not stand in the way and that, in such an eventuality, the question of the possible extradition of Prabakaran to India would assume lower priority.

Thus, the position as prevailing today seems to be as follows:

• The LTTE is prepared for talks with the Government if there are no political pre-conditions from either side and if its military pre-condition for a de-escalation is accepted by the Government.
• The Government is not prepared to accept the LTTE`s military pre-condition and is, at the same time, proposing a political pre-condition that the agenda would cover only devolution and not separation.

Under such circumstances, the prospects of an immediate forward movement towards talks do not seem bright. Unless and until the LTTE is able to replenish its stocks of anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles or neutralise the Air Force`s newly-acquired capability through ground attacks on the Air Force bases, any spectacular change in the ground situation in its favour is unlikely. On the other side, the Sri Lankan military will continue to face difficulties in converting the military stalemate into a decisive victory, even if it receives more arms and ammunition from abroad. The current stalemate ensures that neither side would be able to force the other to come to the negotiating table on its terms.

The main cause for concern to the LTTE at present is that any shift in international perspectives to its detriment may affect its ability to mobilise financial and arms supplies from abroad and thereby impair its ability to keep fighting in the long run. The recent posture of reasonableness could be attributed to this, but one should not exaggerate the seriousness of this concern or under-estimate the resilience of the LTTE to find a way out.

An encouraging development for the LTTE would be the recent turn of events in Tamilnadu. While the reports of a nexus between the LTTE and Veerappan lack corroboration, the recent events relating to the kidnapping of Rajkumar, the film actor, and the use of "Tamil nationalist" and pro-LTTE elements by the Government of Tamilnadu and possibly also of Karnataka for securing his release have shown the extent to which the LTTE has succeeded in rehabilitating itself in the minds of at least some sections of the Tamils.

Their number is as yet small, but what should be a matter of concern is the trend towards less reticence in talking favourably or sympathetically of the LTTE and its demand for Tamil Eelam. This trend has received a fillip from the activities of pro-LTTE leaders such as Mr.Vaiko of the MDMK and Mr.P.Nedumaran of the Tamil Nationalist Movement. Mr.Vaiko has been comparing the Tamil Eelam movement to the Palestinian movement and Mr.Nedumaran to the Bangladesh movement in 1971.

It is understood that in his public meetings, Mr.Nedumaran has been asking: The Bengalis of West Bengal were not called anti-national for supporting the Bangladesh movement; why are the Tamils of Tamil Nadu being called anti-national for supporting Tamil Eelam and the LTTE?

He refers to the alacrity with which the Government of India, according to him, went to the humanitarian assistance of the Gujaratis of Uganda during the days of Idi Amin and of the Punjabis of Kuwait in 1991, and criticises what he describes as a lack of similar alacrity when the victims are Tamils as in Myanmar in the 1960s and in Sri Lanka now. He makes no distinction between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils. For him, what is material is the cultural and not the territorial origin.

These arguments do appeal to some sections of the Tamils in Tamil Nadu, but it would be difficult to quantify them.

The Government of India`s policy has to have a mix of diplomatic, political and humanitarian components.

The diplomatic component should ensure that external forces, even if they be benign as in the case of Israel and Norway, do not take advantage of Colombo`s requirements of arms and ammunition and India`s inability to play the role of a facilitator of a dialogue between the Government and the LTTE to develop pockets of influence in Sri Lanka, either for themselves or as surrogates for other powers such as the US, which could be detrimental to India`s long-term interests.

The political component should focus on continuously nudging the Government of Sri Lanka and other political parties towards a negotiated solution, which would substantially meet the aspirations of the Tamils without endangering the unity of Sri Lanka. While doing this, the Government of India should avoid identifying itself with any particular devolution or other political formula. There cannot be a political solution to the ethnic conflict without the participation of the LTTE. How to moderate the LTTE`s policies and actions without according acceptability to Prabakaran is a question, which is inconvenient, but unavoidable. There is no easy answer to this now, when public opinion in India, including Tamil Nadu, is strongly against Prabakaran, as the suspected master-mind behind Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination, but this question has to be kept continuously under examination.

The humanitarian component is no less important, particularly from the point of view of the sensitivities of the people of Tamil Nadu. It has three dimensions:

• Greater attention to the problems and grievances of the Tamils of Indian origin in the plantation areas.
• More energetic responses to the perceived havoc which the Sri Lankan Navy has been causing to the lives and livelihood of a large number of families of Tamil fishermen in the Southern coastal areas under the pretext of counter-LTTE operations. There was already a feeling of hurt in sections of Tamil Nadu over the action of the Government of India in handing over Kachathivu to Sri Lanka without heed to its impact on the livelihood of Tamil fishermen. This is being aggravated now by the actions of the Sri Lankan Navy.
• Greater articulation of the Government of India`s concerns over the humanitarian impact of the economic embargoes allegedly imposed by the Sri Lankan Army on the Tamil population, perceived to be sympathetic to the LTTE. The magnitude of this problem has to be carefully studied before articulating a policy response. A close interaction with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has an active presence in that area, should help in ascertaining the real facts of the situation before New Delhi reacts.

The diplomatic and political components have to be handled discreetly in low profile, but the humanitarian component has to be addressed more visibly and vocally so that the people of Tamil Nadu know what the Government of India is doing.