The first week of July 1995 was a period of exceptional calm in Kashmir. The level of violence was on the decline and state officials for the first time in many years were readying for a more relaxed summer. But that expectation proved to be short-lived. A mysterious group calling itself Al Faran said it had picked up six Western tourists and would execute them if 22 terrorists incarcerated in Indian jails were not immediately released.
As state officials and the security forces scrambled into action, it was clear that here was a problem that would not be solved in a hurry. For, among the jailed terrorists the group called Al Faran wanted released were five of the most wanted men in India - all members of the dangerous Pakistan based Harkat ul Ansar terrorist organisation. These men had been captured with a lot of luck and after great effort. Three of them - Masood Azhar, Sajjad Afgani and Nassrullah Langaryar - comprised the senior most leadership of the organisation. These men had trained Mujihideen in Afghanistan and later saboteurs for operations in Tajikistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and other countries where Islam was supposedly in danger. Releasing these men would have been tantamount to unleashing another cycle of vicious world-wide violence.
The Indian government refused to accede to the Al Faran group`s demands and accused Pakistani intelligence agencies of planning this operation in order to precipitate a fresh crisis in the Kashmir Valley just when the government was thinking of re-initiating the election process in the state. An earlier attempt to hold elections in the state that year had been stymied by a group of Pakistani gunmen who occupied one of Kashmir`s holiest places: Chrar e Sharif, the shrine of Kashmir`s patron Sufi saint Sheikh Nooruddin. During a shoot-out with the Indian Army on 10 May the same year, Pakistani mercenaries set the shrine on fire and slipped back to Pakistan. The leader of the group, Mast Gul, was accorded a hero`s welcome in Pakistan while the Indian government got the flak for the destruction of the shrine. The Indian government desperately wanted normalcy and elections that would revive the democratic process in the beleaguered state. But the Al Faran abductions meant all that would have to wait.
The slopes of Pahalgam in the eastern part of the Kashmir Valley has traditionally been a favourite tourist spot. At one time, winter would bring a stream of tourists to its famous ski slopes and in summer, the high valleys invited trekkers from the world over. Even during the worst of times in Kashmir (1989-92), foreign tourists did not entirely stop visiting Kashmir and Pahalgam. The battle, it was presumed, was only against the Indian security forces and the Indian government. A total of about 17 foreign tourists had been abducted earlier but those were considered the exception. The US State Department in its travel advisory had, however, warned Americans from visiting the Valley following the fatal shooting of an American in the Valley in 1994. But the tourists kept coming regardless.
Between 4 and 8 July 1995, the local police were alerted about a group that was picking up Western tourists in the Pahalgam region. Nobody knew who the abductors were. They were not locals and did not seem to be Kashmiri at all. Later, Bart Imler, a tourist who had been picked up by the group but mercifully released told newsmen in Srinagar that the abductors appeared to be non-Kashmiris and were speaking a language that sounded like Pashto, the principal language of Afghanistan and Pakistan`s North West Frontier Province. The men sported long beards and their features strongly resembled Afghan Mujahideen seen in photographs.
At any rate, a general alert was sounded by the state authorities and the security forces who were in the process of pulling out of the area were sent back. On 9 July, an Army helicopter on a recce flight spotted a foreigner in a remote part of the mountains and rescued him. This man was John Childs, a 41 year old American, who had been captured but had managed to escape. A visibly shaken Childs was whisked off to New Delhi for debriefing by American Embassy and Indian government officials. Childs did not say a word to the Indian press before flying back home. Months later (11 October 1995) he was to recount his experiences at the University of Hartford`s World Affairs Council in Connecticut, USA. He said he believed his captors were controlled by superiors in Pakistan. "This was a well-disciplined unit. I feel certain they were getting their orders from Pakistan. I saw radios," said Childs. Mr. Childs said he and the other prisoners hated their captors. He said they were constantly bullied by the gun-wielding militants. "We weren`t physically tortured but there was a form of psychological torture," he said. "For example they slaughtered a sheep in front of us, cutting its throat and beheading it in much the same manner they later killed Hans Christian Ostro."
The men who called themselves Al Faran were clearly very dangerous men. They were also highly organised and equipped with sophisticated arms and the latest communications equipment as Childs testified. They were constantly on wireless contact and Indian Army Signal Corps units detected their transmissions aimed at either the areas bordering Pakistan or somewhere within the Valley near the borders. Initially, the Al Faran group comprised 16 men - 14 believed to be Pakistanis and two Afghans. Later, the group swelled to as many as 50, according to local villagers who spotted the group from time to time. With the passage of time, the terrorists adopted a pattern of rotating the guards. While one group kept watch on the hostages or travelled with them, the others rested.
The captors were also utterly ruthless as they were to prove very soon. They thought they had everything wrapped up and within days would achieve their objective of having their comrades released from prison. What they did not reckon was the kind of outrage their action would invoke both within and outside Kashmir. The Kashmiri terrorists generally never harmed Western tourists because they saw in the West a neutral if not sympathetic audience. Besides, tourism has traditionally been the biggest industry in Kashmir. The idea of abducting innocent Western tourists would not have been conceived by any rational Kashmiri terrorist. But the Al Faran clearly were not Kashmiris. They were the fighters of Islam with very different ideas. The West was the enemy. The burning down of the Sufi shrine at Chrar e Sharif had shown how little the Afghan or Pakistani Sunni Muslim cared about the sentiments of Kashmiris and their Sufi traditions. Not surprisingly, virtually all Kashmiri political organisations got together to condemn the kidnappings and observe a bandh (strike) on 25 July. By this time, the whole world had expressed outrage over the abductions and the incident that was to follow.
On the morning of 13 August 1995, a group of Kashmiri women of a village called of Chatthal on the Panzamulla-Salia road, a few kilometres south of Aishmuqam in district Anantnag, discovered Hans Christian Ostro`s decapitated body. `Al-Faran` was carved out with a knife on the torso of Hans Ostro. The severed head was found lying a short distance away from the body. Police identified the beheaded body by noon. The post-mortem revealed that Ostro had been tortured before being murdered. It was a chilling message for the Indian government. But if Al Faran had hoped that brutality would succeed where patience had not, it was mistaken. The beheading evoked an international outcry and even the secessionist Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir gave a strike call to protest the slaying. Al Faran was cornered.
The abduction attracted world-wide condemnation. The American Administration, the Governments of Britain, Germany and Norway, Secretary General United Nations, and even the government of Pakistan officially condemned the abduction. The OIC too for the first time has condemned an act of terrorism in Kashmir. Appeals have been issued from all over the world but Al-Faran remains unmoved. Some Opposition leaders of Pakistan have also condemned the abduction. Newspapers of different countries including Pakistan have severely criticised Al-Faran and generally blamed Pakistan.
The wives of the four hostages, who were anxiously waiting in India for close to four agonising months expecting their husbands to be released, have returned home bitter and disgusted. Before leaving Srinagar, Anne Katrin Hennig, Jane Schelley, Julie Mangan and Catherine Moseley said in a statement "It has been 114 days since Derk Hasert, Don Hutchings, Keith Mangan and Paul Wells were taken hostage in Kashmir. For all that time we have waited anxiously for news of their well being, praying for their safe return to us and struggling to remain optimistic that they will be returned to us soon". They appealed to the abductors, "It would be honourable and humanitarian to release them unharmed so that, like us, they could return to the families, where they belong". But the idea of honour did not evidently impress Al Faran members.
The name Faran or Al-Faran is derived from the sacred mountain site in Saudi Arabia near Mecca. Nobody in the Valley had ever heard of this group, consequently nobody could even guess who these men were. One aim of adopting a name nobody had heard of was clearly to confuse investigators and the public. Nobody could say anything about an unknown group. This would make it harder for the investigating agencies and the security forces to predict their actions and method of functioning. But the real reason for seeking a form of anonymity appears to lie elsewhere. The Kashmir police and other state agencies are convinced that the men calling themselves Al Faran are actually members of another better known organisation called the Harkat ul Ansar.
Not too many people might have heard of the Harkat ul Ansar but in terrorists circles it is an organisation that commands respect and influence. It is based in Pakistan and operates in many countries. It has grown so audacious in recent years that the 1995 State Department Report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism included the Harkat ul Ansar in its list of major world terrorist organisations. This was the first time that a Pakistani terrorist organisation has been added to the State Department list. The brief State Department entry on the organisation provides a clue to the real motive behind the formation of the mysterious Al Faran.
Excerpts from the US Deprtment of State report:
The Harakut ul Ansar Description:
The Harakut ul Ansar (HUA) - an Islamic militant group that seeks Kashmir`s accession to Pakistan - raised its visibility by kidnapping two British citizens in June (1994). The HUA was formed in October 1993 when two Pakistani political activist groups, Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami and Harakut-ul-Mujahideen, merged. According to the leader of the alliance, Maulana Saadatullah Khan, the group`s objective is to continue the armed struggle against non- believers and the anti-Islamic forces.Activities:
The group has carried out a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. The HUA captured Lieutenant Colonel Bhopinder Singh (he was actually a Major and a Lt. Colonel) in January 1994 and demanded that Indian forces turn over an HUA commander in return for Singh`s release. When Indian authorities refused, the militants killed Singh. In mid-May, HUA militants conducted two raids in Doda district in which they stopped buses, forced passengers off, then singled out individuals for execution - the last victim was a 14-year old Muslim boy. The HUA also supports Muslims in Indian-controlled Kashmir with humanitarian and military assistance.Location/Area of Operation:
The HUA is based in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, but HUA members have participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Kashmir, Burma, Tajikistan and Bosnia..."
The mention about the killing of an Indian Army "Lt. Colonel" is significant in that it is a pointer to the real motives of the terrorists calling themselves Al Faran. Their key aim appears to be nothing other than securing the release of a key Harkat leaders lodged in Indian jails. Major Bhupinder Singh was abducted because the Harkat wanted the release of one of their key leaders, Nasrullah Langaryar, captured in November 1993. The Army refused, and Major Singh`s dead body was discovered shortly afterwards. After that two more HuA leaders were nabbed by Indian security force personnel in February 1994. Ever since then, the HUA has been trying to secure their release. Masood Azhar, the senior of the two is in his late 20s and is the chief Harkat ideologue. His father is a rich landowner in Pakistan`s Bhahawalpur district and is reported to be desperate to get his son released from jail in India. He is believed to be pressurising the Harkat and funding them heavily. The other key Harkat man, Sajjad Afgani is also in his 20s and was the chief military commander of the organisation.
Since the arrest of these two men, Harkat activists in India have carried out three well publicised attempts to free their leaders. The first incident took place in the summer of 1994 when two young British tourists were abducted in Kashmir. This was the Harkat`s first attempt at releasing its leaders and it demanded so quite openly. The attempt failed because of the international outcry against the incidents and because of the pressure that was made to bear upon the Pakistani government. It is significant to note that the Harkat ul Ansar operates quite openly in Pakistan. It has offices, camps and conducts special fund raising ceremonies. During one such fund raising campaign in Karachi (5 February 1995), eleven Harkat men were shot dead by unidentified gunmen. Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto publicly condemned the killings and praised the Harkat ul Ansar for helping the Kashmir movement.
After the failure of the first attempt, the Harkat ul Ansar changed its tactics. When it kidnapped four foreigners from Delhi in September-October 1994, the ransom note was sent in the name of a fictitious organisation called Al Fadeedh. The Harkat men wanted to cover their trail. The ransom note demanded the release of several arrested terrorists, including the two key Harkat men. Indian intelligence suspected that the other names were added in an attempt to confuse the police and that their real aim was to free Azhar and Afgani. The gang holding the four Western tourists near Delhi were busted by the local police. The operation led to a shoot out in which one policeman was killed but all the four hostages were rescued unhurt. It was discovered that the kidnappers were all Harkat ul Ansar members. Among them was a student from the London School of Economics, who had been brought to India to lure the foreign tourists. This time too, the Harkat men are using a different name (Al Faran) but their objective remains the same: the release of their leaders from prison.
The Indian government is clearly pinned on the horns of a dilemma but it cannot release the terrorists wanted by Al Faran. Neither can it give the go ahead for a commando style operation to rescue the hostages. The Al Faran are clearly expecting such a move and would have no hesitation in killing their hostages. At the same time, the Al Faran members appear to feel they will lose face if they release the hostages unconditionally. In other words, it is a classic stalemate. And that is the way it has been for months.
Embarrassed by the Al Faran abductions and the attendant international outcry, the Pakistani government tried to muddy the waters by accusing India of masterminding the entire episode including the beheading of Ostro. The Pakistani`s stepped up this line of propaganda after Ostro`s execution. Radio Pakistan in several broadcasts on August 17 and 18 claimed that India itself has "manipulated the incident" and "carried out this act" of killing the Norwegian hostage to "gain sympathy". The charge was repeated by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. It was an outrageous accusation but it did succeed in sowing the seeds of doubt.
The Indian government had nothing to hide and for the first time allowed security experts from the United States, Germany and Britain to station themselves in Srinagar with their telecommunications instruments to monitor the radio conversations with Al Faran. The foreign experts have been given access to the areas where the terrorists are believed to be moving and are been regularly briefed by the Kashmir administration.
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Jeremy Hanely, during his five day Indian visit in late 1995 told newsmen at New Delhi, "We pay a tribute to those who have been working so far and so patiently all these months. I do not think that there is much the Britain can do in Kashmir, but thank those who are handling the situation. We would like to see an early resolution of the hostage problem. The Indian authorities have done practically everything they can to resolve the issue. The nations whose nationals have been taken hostage have been working together very well. It is something terribly important for us."
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, Prime Minister of the Pakistani Occupied part of Kashmir, while addressing the Foreign Correspondents Association in Washington D.C. said, "As the Prime Minister of Kashmir I have no clue of the antecedents of Al-Faran group which has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of foreign tourists recently in Kashmir. These kidnappers are using all the latest equipment while as Prime Minister of Kashmir I have no such facility." Later, (in the third week of October 1995) Sardar Qayyum told newspersons at Muzaffarabad "It is our habit to involve India in all ills". He expressed that New Delhi could not afford to "earn disrepute" through moves like organising kidnappings of foreign tourists. The remarks of Sardar Qayyum are significant given that he has been wholeheartedly supporting the ongoing movement in Kashmir and cannot be branded as an Indian agent even by his worst detractors.
The Pakistani connection with the Al Faran abductions was also evident early in the crisis. It came out in the open with the unexpected visit of a Pakistani Maulana to New Delhi.
Within days of the abductions, an unlikely intermediary appeared on the scene. He was none other than Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the chief of a Pakistani Islamic organisation called the Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Pakistan National Assembly (Parliament). The Maulana claimed that he was contacted by Al Faran and some diplomats to mediate for the release of the hostages. He flew in to New Delhi on 21 July 1995 amidst a blaze of publicity. He admitted having been contacted by Al Faran and made the astonishing statement that no harm would come to the hostages as long as he remained in India. He added that he was doing all this just to help out but had actually come on a personal mission to India. His visit was cut short by Pakistani diplomats who sent him home within a couple of days. But that was not the end of the matter.
Maulana Fazlur Rehman`s close association with Al-Faran was also revealed by the deputy leader of the provincial Assembly of Pakistan`s North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Haji Mohmad Adeel, who accused Fazlur Rehman of trying to introduce sectarianism and terrorism in Kashmir. Criticising Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Qazi Hussain Ahmed of Jamaat e Islami, Adeel claimed that the Maulana had helped establish the Al-Faran group involved in the kidnapping which he added had attracted world-wide criticism. The Maulana who he said had earlier admitted of being in contact with the abductors had now backed out fearing being labeled a terrorist by the West (The News, Pakistan - July 23).
One of the most incredible fall-out of the entire incident is the controversy generated by the Pakistani government stand on the issue. Within Pakistan a number of key politicians have lambasted the government for its double standards. For instance, the Pakistani Awami National Party of Khan Wali Khan put the blame squarely on Pakistan for the present hostage crisis in Kashmir. In a press statement issued on July 24 1995, it accused the Al-Faran of being the brain-child of Maulana Fazlur Rehman. According to the statement, "Soon after Benazir Bhutto nominated him as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in obvious return for his political support, he form this vantage point established contacts with various militant groups in Kashmir and created this new outfit, Al-Faran".
"Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, Secretary General, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami said, "Pakistan is crying that it has no hand in the held Kashmir situation but on the contrary Maulana Fazlur Rehman told Zee TV on arrival in India that he had received a phone call from Al-Faran that as long as he was in India, the hostages would not be harmed. On this the Zee TV had said, then we would keep you in India".
Abductions have become a tragic tradition in Kashmir ever since the violent secessionist movement started in 1989. In fact, the present movement in Kashmir came into world focus with the sensational kidnapping of Dr Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. For the terrorists it was the right move at the right time. The terrorists firstly demonstrated how easy it was to pick up a target. Second, the terrorists proved that they could humble the seemingly all powerful state apparatus. At that time, the Indian government decided to accept the terrorists` demands and the Home Minister`s daughter was released in exchange of five extremely dangerous terrorists.
The government had exposed its Achilles heel. Abductions increased sharply; and every time the government failed to meet the terrorists` demands, the innocent hostages were killed. One of the most tragic incidents involved the abduction of the well-know Islamic scholar and vice chancellor of Kashmir University, Professor Mushir ul Huq and his personal assistant Abdul Gani. The two men were kidnapped in April 1990. They were ultimately taken to an open field and told they were being set free. As they began walking away, the terrorists opened fire. They were shot in the back in cold blood. The Professor`s son-in-law, Furqan Qamar, who was brought to Srinagar from New Delhi to identify the body recalled in an interview that the Professor`s face looked utterly peaceful at death - it was as if till the last moment he had no inkling of what was coming to him. There was a message in this killing: the Government should accede to any demand from the terrorists within a maximum of four days or else the hostages would be killed.
Abductions rose sharply after the Rubaiya Sayeed incident and by late 1990, it was clear that giving in to the terrorists` demands was no solution because it only encouraged further abductions. The Kashmir government tacitly decided not to trade hostages for captured terrorists. This became a matter of undeclared policy. The abduction of high value targets declined sharply but not the abduction of soft targets.
Leaders of Kashmiri terrorist outfits have admitted that they used abductions as a weapon to get their colleagues released from jail. Hundreds of local Kashmiris, government employees and civilians have been kidnapped and slaughtered by Kashmiri terrorists. They have gone unlamented by the media, mourned only by their families. Between 1989 and end 1995, as many as 1,428 persons have been abducted in Kashmir by militants. Of these more than a third (503) have been killed and amongst those released most have complained of torture or rape or extortion. A large number of persons abducted by militants remain un-traced. This fact was highlighted by Amnesty International in 1994, which appealed to all militant groups to release the hostages. But the appeal fell on deaf ears. The list of abductions continues to grow as does the death list of innocents. In all these years, however, just 23 foreigners, including those taken hostage by Al Faran, have been abducted.
The sad part is that never before have any of these abductions been protested by Kashmiri political parties and leaders. Not a word of protest has been issued against the previous abductions. No markets ever closed because they of the killing of innocents. No shutters have been downed when their throats were cut and their bodies thrown by the roadside. Neither the secessionist Kashmiri political groups nor the Pakistani government have ever raised their voice against the cult of abduction. It is only in the Al Faran case that matters are entirely different. The killing of Hans Christian Ostro was clearly bad publicity. It outraged the international community.
At present the abductors don`t seem to know what to do next. During the summer, they had climbed with their hostages to the higher ranges in the Pir Panjal mountains. The abductors were shifting the hostages continuously from one hide-out to another. Indian security forces constantly monitoring the progress of the group but not attacking for obvious reasons, found the abductors leaving Pahalgam and moving to hamlets of Inshan and Aft in the Wardhwan Valley in Kishtwar (Doda district). Once winter began setting in, the snow and sleet drove the group down to the southern district of Anantnag.
They were sighted in Ladoora, a village on Khanahal-Pahalgam road on the night of 7 October 1995. Villagers told a group of visiting journalists that the hostages and their captors appeared in the village, stayed for the night and left the next morning. The number of captors was around fifty, according to the villagers, and one of the hostages was limping. The villagers said, "All the four hostages were having beards and were dressed in Kashmiri attire, making it difficult to distinguish them from the captors.
From all indications the main group comprising Pakistani and Afghan nationals want to slip back to Pakistan but are not sure how to do it. The Indian authorities suspect that the Pakistani government will not allow any of the abductors to live once they cross over to Pakistan in the fear that they might talk and further embarrass the Pakistani government. This realisation might have also dawned on the captors. Some newspapers suggest that there the Pakistani/Afghan abductors are being replaced with local Kashmiri cadres. A part of the plan appears to have been already accomplished. While the number of captors was 16 originally, the size of the group has swollen to over fifty and the majority of them are Kashmiris. The process of "Kashmirisation" and withdrawal of foreigners could be an attempt to dispel the notion that the abductors were Afghanis or Pakistanis.
A fresh appeal by Hurriyat leaders "to set the hostages free on humanitarian grounds if they are really Muslims" had made matters worse for Al Faran. They, in fact, wanted the secessionist Hurriyat Conference to come to their rescue and mediate between them and the government. But this plea was turned down by the Hurriyat which did not want to be seen mediating between Al Faran and the Indian authorities. The abductors are clearly incensed by and in a statement said: "If the Hurriyat is unable to mediate, then they have no right to call themselves the champions of the Kashmiri cause".
A new twist to the hostage drama was added by the Al-Faran issuing an Urdu press note (11 December 1995) claiming that after an encounter with the Army at Dabran (Anantnag) the four foreign hostages were no longer with them. "After the encounter, Indian soldiers arrested three Western tourists while the fourth one is missing", the Al Faran press release said. The press release also boasted that 19 Army personnel were killed by them in the battle. What really happened was that five mercenaries, including Al Faran leader Abdul Hamid alias Turki, were killed in an encounter with the Rashtriya Rifles at Dabran in Anantnag district on 4 December. The others killed in the encounter have been identified as Nabi Gazal (NWFP), Abu Khafia (POK), Shinder Mohammed (Kishtwar) and Mohd Harron (Badrawah).
At this point of time, it does not appear very likely that the hostages are still alive. Radio communications between the terrorists and government officials broke down long ago. The Indian authorities have not come out with any statement as to whether the hostages are dead or alive. If the hostages have not been sighted in months it would appear that they have been killed and buried. In the circumstances, the Indian authorities should immediately launch a full fledged operation to capture and punish the terrorists involved and tell the relatives of the unfortunate persons taken hostage that there is no real hope.