EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
It would be over-optimistic to view the USA`s supportive attitude to India during the recent Kargil conflict essentially as an indicator of India`s enhanced importance in the US perception.
The US attitude, which definitely helped India in finding an end to the conflict earlier than initially apprehended, was partly the result of US concerns over the implications of an armed conflict between two countries with newly-acquired nuclear weapons capabilities, but without as yet well-established safeguards against their unthinking or irrational use and partly a reflection of the increasing exasperation of the US policy-makers in dealing with a Talibanised Afghanistan and a Pakistan, which due to the contagion from a self-created Taliban, runs the risk of degenerating from a progressive Islamic State, as it was valued hitherto, to an epicenter of all the destabilising extremist and terrorist forces of the region, if not the world.
The exasperation arises from the non-cooperation of Pakistan with the US in moderating the policies of the Taliban and in bringing to justice Osama bin Laden and the terrorist groups which have gathered around him under the protection of the Taliban and from the constraints on the US which prevent it from dealing punitively with Pakistan in the same way as it normally deals with other perceived proliferators of terrorism.
These constraints are due not only to Pakistan`s role as a faithful ally in the past and to the importance which Pakistan still enjoys in the eyes of the US as a window on Iran, Iraq and the Muslim majority Xinjiang province of China and as an important US platform in its operations against narcotics production and smuggling, but also to fears that any ill-advised punitive action against Pakistan could prove counter-productive by pushing the nuclear Pakistani State and society further into the hands of extremist and irrational forces .
How to guard its still considerable influence over Pakistan`s political, military and intelligence leaderships, without letting it be eroded by Pakistani perceptions of an unsympathetic US attitude in Indo-Pakistani matters and, at the same time, how to ensure that the USA`s reluctance for punitive action against Pakistan does not encourage it on an adventurist course against India---that is the dilemma facing US policy-makers.
This dilemma has been increasingly evident in the case relating to the proliferation of terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan in general and to the as yet uncontrolled activities of bin Laden and his groups in particular. Between February,1998, when bin Laden announced the formation of his International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel and the US bombing of the training camps of these groups in Afghanistan in August,1998, the US pressure was mainly on Afghanistan.
Since September,1998, the pressure has been exercised equally on Pakistan in order to make it moderate the activities of the Taliban and induce it to co-operate with the US in bringing bin Laden and his groups to justice. Anger that instead of responding to this pressure, the Pakistani leadership tried to use these groups against India in the Kargil sector was an important factor in the US decision to lean heavily on Pakistan in order to force it to call off its adventurist action.
The Taliban`s stand is that the US has not been able to produce any credible evidence against bin Laden and that, even if it did, it would like to have him tried under Islamic laws either in Afghanistan itself or in another Muslim country. It is opposed to his being tried in the US or any other Western country under Western laws.
Pakistan argues that its influence over the Taliban has been over-stated and that, since bin Laden is in Afghan territory, the matter has to be sorted out by the US directly with the Taliban. Pakistan highlights its co-operation with the US in the arrest and deportation to the US of Mir Aimal Kansi, wanted for the murder of two CIA officers in Washington, Ramzi Yousef, a participant in the New York World Trade Centre bombing in 1993 and an Arab follower of bin Laden allegedly involved in the Nairobi blasts of last year and says it is helpless in the case of bin Laden as he lives in Afghan territory.
There are limits to the efficacy of US economic sanctions against the Taliban since the Taliban-led Government in Kabul has managed to run the country since September,1996, without any foreign assistance, mainly with the help of narcotics money and the proceeds of the large-scale smuggling to Pakistan of foreign goods imported into Afghanistan through Karachi without duty under the transit trade agreement with Pakistan.
The US has difficulty in declaring Afghanistan as a State sponsor of terrorism since the Burhanuddin Rabbani Government, which controls only 10 per cent of the territory, is still recognised by the UN as the legal Government of Afghanistan and it has no nexus with bin Laden and his groups.
Declaring Taliban as an international terrorist organisation also poses a problem for the US since though the Taliban has given shelter to bin Laden and his groups, there is no evidence of its direct involvement in acts of terrorism in foreign countries.
Even though allegations are often made in India of the involvement of the Taliban in acts of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, the Taliban has strongly denied them. It says that while it supports the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris, it would not be in a position to assist them on the ground till it is able to extend its control over the entire Afghan territory.
Taliban sources allege that the large number of Afghans operating in Kashmir are the followers of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar of the Hizbe Islami, who have been sent there by the Jamaat e Islami of Pakistan, and accuses them of masquerading as Taliban members in order to have it further discredited in the eyes of the world as a terrorist organisation.
The limits to the efficacy of US pressure on Pakistan arise from the fact that so many religious organisations, governmental agencies, political parties, non-governmental organisations and senior officers of the military and the intelligence, serving as well as retired, are so inextricably involved with the Taliban,bin Laden and his groups that even if the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, wants to co-operate with the US, he might find it difficult to operate through these never-ending layers of protection enjoyed by them.
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of terrorism, particularly the State-sponsored variety, has been an important objective of state policy of successive US administrations. These two objectives have acquired an added urgency in the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan because of reports of bin Laden and his groups looking for WMD and of US concerns over the possibility of irrational pro-bin Laden elements in Pakistan`s military and scientific establishments helping him in acquiring this capability.
The consequent US pressure on Pakistan has been indirectly beneficial to India, but it would be incorrect to jump to the conclusion therefrom that Indo-US relations have taken a turn for the better to the detriment of Pakistan.
The attached chronology traces how the US has been steadily building up pressure on Pakistan on this issue since the end of last year.
US, PAKISTAN AND BIN LADEN: A CHRONOLOGY (DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER,1998)
Mr.Abdul Hai Mutmaen, a Taliban spokesman, announced at Kabul on November 20,1998, that bin Laden had been found innocent of all US charges of terrorism and that he would, therefore, continue to be a welcome guest in Afghanistan. He said that the Afghan Supreme Court had cleared him of the allegation that he was responsible for the bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He added: " We had set a deadline for evidence to be produced to prove his involvement in the killings. Nobody was able to do so. He has, therefore, been cleared. He can live in Afghanistan as a Muslim guest, but his political and military activities would continue to be banned."
Mr.Ejaz Haider, the well-known Pakistani columnist, wrote in the "Friday Times" (week of November 21-26, 1998) as follows: " Whenever the Government cracks down on the Deobandi sectarian parties (Sipah Sahaba Pakistan and its splinter group Lashkar Jhangvi), the sectarian terrorists simply slip away to Afghanistan and find sanctuaries in camps run by the Harkat-ul-Ansar. This is a fact known to Islamabad.But, since these Deobandi militants also fight in Kashmir, Islamabad chooses to look the other way. "
He added: "It was no coincidence that the camps struck by US missiles threw up so many corpses of Punjabi Pakistanis. This fact is also known to Riyadh and Washington. Washington remains tight-lipped on this for its own reasons. It was forced to strike the camps in Afghanistan, but its rebuff to New Delhi not to apply that precedent in Kashmir clearly shows that its other pressing concerns would not allow it to take a clear line on this. "
He further wrote: " After all, Osama bin Laden is not exactly a stranger to Washington. During the height of the war against the Soviets, he was the blue-eyed boy of the Saudi intelligence and ran his Bayt al-Ansar (House of Auxiliaries) in collaboration with the Jordanian-Palestinian Muslim brother Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar. Their activities were heavily funded by the Saudi intelligence and the CIA knew all about Osama."
Before Mr.Nawaz Sharif`s visit to Washington in the first week of December,1998, there was intense speculation in the Pakistani press that the bin Laden and terrorism proliferation issues had become as important a benchmark in US-Pakistan relations as the nuclear proliferation one. In a series of three articles in the "Nation" (November 24,25 and 26,1998), Syed Talat Hussain, another well-informed columnist, wrote as follows:
"One of the worst apprehensions Washington has is that someone from Osama`s group might be able to acquire usable nuclear technology which would give the threat from the holy warriors a whole new and deadlier dimension. Already the West is accusing the supporters of Osama of attempts to gain a nuclear sword. There have been reports of some of those allegedly belonging to Osama`s party, who were caught from Europe, were trying to buy nuclear secrets."
He added: " Whether true or not, such reports put in perspective the mind set the West and its allies bring to the issue of sensitive technologies export control in South Asia and, particularly Pakistan, an Islamic country going further right and whose establishment, they suspect, has strong links with Kabul and Kandahar.
" These fears of the world community have also been fanned to some extent by loose talk of too-clever-for-the-country`s-good brand of individuals in the wake of the May nuclear explosions.
"In that heady moment, when a lot of trash with nuclear wrappers was sold in the credulous market of public opinion, certain circles in the policy-makers` hierarchy were toying with the idea of "letting the world know" that, if pushed to the wall, and if slapped with unbearable sanctions, Pakistan would begin to sell nuclear technology," he concluded.
The entourage of Mr. Sharif, who had accompanied him to Washington in the first week of December,1998, projected his talks with President Clinton and officials of the State Department as successful. According to them, the talks resulted in a solution to the question of the re-payment to Pakistan of part of the amount which it had paid in the 1980s for 28 F-16 aircraft whose delivery was blocked by the then US President, Mr.George Bush, under the Presser Amendment.
They also claimed that the talks were expected to pave the way for the repeal of the Pakistan-specific Presser Amendment and thereby restore Pakistan`s arms purchase relationship with the US.
However, this rosy assessment was contradicted by the Pakistani journalists who had accompanied Mr. Sharif. They reported that, in addition to the nuclear and missile issues, the Taliban and bin Laden issues were being used by the Clinton Administration as benchmarks to assess US-Pakistani relations and that Mr.Sharif and his officials were taken aback by the vehemence of the remarks of Mr.Clinton, Mrs.Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, and senior officials of the State Department on the bin Laden issue.
Even sections of the US press corroborated the assessment of the Pakistani journalists. The "Washington Post" reported on December 3,1998, that Mr.Clinton told Mr.Sharif that Washington wanted further commitments from Pakistan on the nuclear and missile, Taliban and bin Laden issues before it could consider further steps to expand its ties with Pakistan.
Syed Talat Hussain wrote in the "Nation" of December 5,1998:" In fact, more than Kashmir and in addition to non-proliferation, the other issue which figured most prominently was that of Osama bin Laden`s presence in Afghanistan, which the USA links with the larger concern of terrorism in the region and that of the Taliban movement."
He added: "It was not as if this topic turned up during the Washington discussions out of nowhere. Much before Mr.Nawaz went to Washington, when details of the visit were being finalised, US officials had signalled that Osama would be on the agenda of the talks. However, the (Pakistani) Foreign Office`s handout contained nothing on the subject except a one-word mention of Afghanistan and that too at the very end of it."
The joint statement issued at the end of the visit of Mr.Sharif to Washington on December 4,1998, merely said as follows: " The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their strong opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They expressed their resolve to work closely to combat international terrorism and emphasised the need for prompt and effective action against international terrorists."
However, in a subsequent briefing for pressmen, Mr. Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, said as follows: " All US participants at the Oval Office meeting on December 2 made it clear that of primary importance to the US Government was the expulsion of Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan so that he could be brought to justice. And our view was made very clear to our Pakistani guests. Pakistan is well aware of our views on this. Pakistan is well aware of the impact of Osama bin Laden on the region. We have asked Pakistan for assistance and I think that the message came through loud and clear to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif."
When asked by a journalist why the Saudis were not in the loop to influence bin Laden since he was a Saudi citizen and his father still had business in Saudi Arabia, Mr. Inderfurth said Saudi assistance was also being sought.. He, however, denied that during the meeting with Mr.Clinton it was suggested that Pakistan should break off its diplomatic ties with the Taliban.
However, the "News" of Islamabad (December 4) claimed that the US wanted a clean break in Pakistan`s ties with the Taliban, at least until it stopped harbouring Osama.The paper said that Mr.Sharif told Mr.Clinton that Pakistan "cannot order a sovereign state like Afghanistan and force the Taliban to do its bidding."
According to the paper, Mr. Sharif told Mr.Clinton that Pakistan was the most affected by the Afghan conflict and had been burdened by refugees and narcotics as a spillover effect. He then added: "Pakistan will be very happy to extend all help and assistance, especially on the issue of terrorism."
The correspondent of the "News" (December 4) quoted Mr.Inderfurth as having stated as follows:" Secretary Albright said we have very serious problems with the Taliban, including their treatment of women and girls.All made it clear that of primary importance to the US Government is the expulsion of Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan so that he can be brought to justice."
According to the "News", Mr.Inderfurth further said: " While I don`t intend to go into details of what was said about Osama bin Laden in the meeting, I think it is fair to say that there was no love lost, nor any sympathies expressed for Osama in that meeting. In our view about Osama, it is very simple---he is a terrorist, he is a murderer, he plans to kill again and we want him brought to justice. And that view was made very clear to our Pakistani guests. "
Asked how the US intended to move in the matter, Mr.Inderfurth replied:" The means to accomplish that are several in terms of working with other governments, in terms of doing things that the National Security Council has been responsible for and in terms of the financial assets of Osama. This is an effort that is being undertaken by all responsible agencies and departments of the Government and we hope that it will be successful."
An American correspondent then asked Mr.Inderfurth to comment on reports of Osama`s involvement in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. He replied as follows: "I think that the question of the training of terrorists that may operate in Kashmir is a serious question. It is one that we are also concerned about. It, therefore, underscores the importance of getting Osama out of Afghanistan and brought to justice. And a full-court review is underway to do precisely that."
Commenting on reports of the Sharif-Clinton meeting, Mr.Amir Khan Muttaqi, the acting Taliban Minister for Information, said in Kabul on December 3:" Osama is an excuse for the US to harass Afghanistan and maintain its presence in the region. He is harmless. Anybody saying anything against the US is dubbed a terrorist."
The correspondent of the "Nation" (December 7) reported that Mr.Sharif pointed out to Mr.Clinton that Pakistan had a good track record in counter-terrorism and had in the past handed over to the US some terrorists wanted by it. He also reportedly described the US bombing of terrorists` training camps in Afghanistan in August last year as counter-productive. He felt that other means should have been used to capture bin Laden.
The correspondent also claimed that Mr.Sharif also informed Mr.Clinton that according to the Pakistani intelligence agencies, Osama was gravely ill and might not live for long.
In an editorial on the Washington talks, the "News" of December 9 referred to the intensity of the US pressure on Pakistan on the nuclear non-proliferation and bin Laden issues and said: "The US demand (on Osama) is obviously not acceptable to many political and religious circles in Pakistan and pursuing it will only make the Government unpopular and create political instability."
Syed Talat Hussain wrote in the "Nation" (December 12) as follows: "Informed Pakistani observers say that through the meetings with American officials and also through the talks between President Bill Clinton and Mr.Nawaz, Washington made it clear that it would pursue Osama with or without Pakistani assistance, but better with than without."
Speaking during a debate on Afghanistan in the UN Security Council in the first week of December, Ms.Nancy Soderberg, a member of the US delegation, said: "Afghanistan-based terrorism has become a plague. Terrorists trained or based in Afghanistan have been responsible for incidents in all corners of the globe. "
Commenting on her speech and on Mr.Sharif`s talks in Washington, Mr.Nasim Zehra, another well-known Pakistani columnist, wrote in the "Nation" of December 18 as follows: " For Pakistan, jihadi Islam has become a double-edged sword. While, for example, the Kashmir jihad gains sustenance from it, Pakistan`s own internal security and social peace are adversely affected by this jihadi Islam. Beyond Kashmir, some of the battle-cries of this jihadi Islam against the selective morality of the West do strike a resonance in Pakistani hearts. Caught in this paradoxical bind, the Nawaz Sharif Government will extend Washington no support to extradite Osama."
It added: " There appears to be a total unanimity among the Pakistanis that as a moderate state having links with all brands of Muslim states and Islamic movements, no institution---including the Foreign Office, the political leadership and the military---wants to have anything to do with Washington`s anti-Osama crusade."
In an interview given on December 23 at Kandahar to a correspondent of the "News," Osama accused the Riyadh Governor, Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, who is a brother of King Fahd, of having sent three hired Saudi mercenaries to Afghanistan to have him assassinated. Osama claimed that the plan was foiled by the Taliban.
Osama further said: "I know that the Pakistan Government is under pressure from the Christian-Jewish coalition to prevail upon the Taliban to expel me from Afghanistan. The pressure is part of a conspiracy against the Muslim Ummah.