Pakistan's ambitions have matured and expanded well beyond its national borders, argues Yossef Bodansky, Director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Pakistan today appears to have a grand design which goes much beyond Kashmir and which seeks to establish a position of overwhelming influence, if not hegemony, in the Trans-Asian region. Pakistan wants to be the linchpin in the strategic chain which includes Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East and China. In its efforts to establish control over the strategic axes that run through this region, Pakistan desperately needs to absorb Kashmir and thus consolidate its borders with China. Pakistan's arming and funding of the Taliban to control southern Afghanistan and the trade route to Central Asia is part of this design. So are its attempts to de-stabilise the government of Tajikistan and establish an Islamic, pro-Pakistani government in that country.

KASHMIR PART OF PAKISTAN'S EXTRA-TERRITORIAL DESIGNS

Beijing's present and near-future grand strategy considers the revival of the Silk Road as a primary regional strategic entity. The land based transportation system - stretching along the traditional Silk Route - is of crucial significance to the consolidation of the Trans-Asian Axis and the key to Beijing's global power posture and strategic safety. The Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) self-acknowledged naval inferiority reduces the strategic use of the Indian Ocean, and thus increases the importance of the land based lines of communications for the consolidation and enhancement of the Trans-Asian Axis.

The Silk Route is actually a set of primary axes of transportation running through the heart of Asia. The principal axes run in parallel between the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and the heart of China, roughly from east to west and vice versa. A set of auxiliary axes, roughly perpendicular to the principal axes, feed into the Silk Route from the heart of Russia and from the shores of the Indian Ocean. The primary choke point of the Silk Route and its gateway into China is the Taklamakan Desert. West of the Taklamakan Desert are the strategic cities of Kashi (traditional name Kashgar) and Yarkand - both in China's western province of Xinjiang. Several axes of transportation, both the principal axes traversing through the Balkh and Pamir mountains (to-day's northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan respectively) as well as a feeder axis from the Indian Ocean through the lower Himalayas (today's Pakistan and Indian Kashmir), converge on Kashi/Yarkand, from where they proceed into the Chinese interior.

Essentially, whoever controls the access roads to Kashgar and Yarkand controls the gateways to China on the Silk Route. There is only one other overland gateway into China - the brand new and fragile Karakoram Highway. Twisting through northern Pakistan along a narrow corridor and precarious mountain passes, the Highway enters western China where it feeds into Kashi (Kashgar) and the traditional roads encircling the Taklamakan Desert. Work on the Karakoram Highway started in 1967. A passable road was completed only in 1978, and fully opened for traffic in 1986. The Karakoram Highway is a strategic breakthrough for Beijing and Islamabad. It broke the isolation of both countries, ensuring a corridor that can withstand blockade even during intense warfare.

Islamabad considers the Karakoram Highway to be a symbol and manifestation of the unique Sino-Pakistani relationship and their strategic unity of purpose. Recently, Islamabad expanded this theme to include the emerging Silk Route. For example, Pakistani officials stressed in late December 1993 that "the role of China in the construction of the Silk Route has made the bilateral relations as strong as the Karakoram Highway."

The Pakistani strategic calculation is that if Pakistan can become the dominant or hegemonic power over the western gateways to China, Islamabad will be in a position to exert influence over the entire Trans-Asian Axis. Such a position, reinforcing Pakistan's already unique position as the linchpin between the PRC and the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, will enable Pakistan to enjoy economic and political benefits far beyond what it is possible given the country's economic, scientific, technological and population levels.

Sophisticated as the Pakistani strategic grand design may be, it nevertheless confronts a very grim reality: the tracks of road which Islamabad is determined to control, or at the very least secure hegemony over, happen to be on the sovereign territory of Tajikistan, Afghanistan and India. However, this reality does not seem to deter or restrain Islamabad. Therefore, in pursuit of these objectives, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency, the ISI, has recently launched a relentless drive to ensure that local Islamist irregular forces (most of whom are already Pakistan's protégés sponsored by the ISI) ultimately control all key roads and axes in recognition of Islamabad's hegemony over the western gateways of China.

AFGHANISTAN

Recent ISI operations in Afghanistan can be considered a trend setter. The accumulated Afghan experience of the ISI convinced Islamabad of the strategic importance of roads and provided precedents for using state-controlled irregular warfare - like the Afghan Mujahideen forces - as strategic instruments for state policy. By the mid 1990s, the ISI would support major campaigns to change the character of Afghanistan, and the region as a whole.

By 1994, in pursuant of Islamabad's self-perceived role as the junction for commerce and transportation between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean, the ISI embarked on an ambitious program to consolidate de-facto control over the Kushka-Herat-Qandahar-Quetta highway. This road is the only strategic artery in relatively good shape that can be rebuilt and carry massive convoys with relative ease. It should be remembered that the Dostum-Massud and ISI-Tajikistan fighting have all but closed the Termez-Salang-Kabul highway.

Thus, Pakistan embarked on an ambitious project to repair the most damaged sectors of the Kushka-Herat-Qandahar-Quetta highway in Afghanistan. To ensure Pakistan's actual control over this vital road, the ISI subverted local leaders and chieftains by making deals with them (giving weapons and money, providing outlets for Helmand Valley, drugs, etc.). In 1994, the ISI struck deals with aspiring warlords and drug-dealers pretending to be Mujahideen commanders. These newly empowered leaders turned on the population and abused their power and special relations with Pakistan which remains Afghanistan's sole gateway for Western goods.

Within a few months, the situation exploded, and a new force emerged on the scene - the Taliban. The recognised leader of the Taliban is Mulawi Mohammed Omar from Qandahar, a veteran Pushtun Mujahideen commander turned religious student. The legend of his rise to a leadership position is indicative of the socio-political motivation of the Taliban movement as a whole. In the fall of 1994, as the legend goes, the Prophet Mohammad came to Mulawi Mohammed Omar in his dream and told him to cleanse his tribe from a sinful oppressive warlord installed by the ISI who was notorious for rape and pillaging. After receiving permission from his Mullah, Mohammed Omar organised a force of 50 comrades, all former Mujahideen who had served under him in the 1980s, and assassinated the warlord. He then distributed the warlord's confiscated property to the poor and needy of the Qandahar area. He accepted the warlord's weapons and fighters into a fledgling religious movement under his command. The new command would be known as the Taliban - the students of religious schools - in honour of the origin of its leaders.

Reality is more mundane and of strategic significance. The Taliban emerged as a result of a calculated organisation and activation of Islamist Pushtun forces initially sponsored jointly by Tehran and Islamabad. The hard core of the Taliban are indeed Pushtun religious students and young Islamist clergy. They were eager to rebel against the corrupt ISI-installed warlords and crime-bosses but could not do so until they got support from the ISI. Once empowered, they initially established themselves in the Qandahar area where the destruction of the long-established tribal royalist leadership had left a void yearning to be filled.

In late 1994 and early 1995, the ISI began assisting the Taliban in a massive way by providing new Kalashnikov assault rifles, large quantities of ammunition, training , logistics, etc. Indeed, at a meeting in Islamabad in 1994, Hekmatyar complained to then ISI chief Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf about the ISI's growing assistance to the Taliban. Significantly, the Taliban's emerging political religious leadership is made up of protégés of the Pakistani Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman. By mid 1995, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam had emerged as an umbrella organisation for a dozen smaller Islamist organisations including some of the most violent in Pakistan.

By February, 1995 the Taliban forces reached some 25,000, predominantly Pushtuns. There were also over a thousand Tajiks and Uzbeks from the Jowzjani special forces sent to Qandahar in the last days of Najib. These troops served not only to add military skills and expertise, but also to open channels of communications to Dostum, their former commander, and co-operate with his NIM ( National Islamic Movement forces of General Abdul Rashid Dostum). With the fall of Herat in early September, the Taliban secured for Pakistan, control over the sole non-Iranian route between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia: the Herat-Qandahar-Quetta segment of the Kushka-Herat-Qandahar-Quetta highway, the road Islamabad has been yearning to dominate.

KASHMIR

The evolution of the strategic character of ISI clandestine operations is best reflected in recent transportation of the ISI- sponsored Islamic terrorism in Indian Kashmir.

Pakistan did not "discover" the Kashmir issue as a result of the revival of the Silk Road. Pakistan has always coveted Kashmir. However, in recent years there has been a profound transformation of the Pakistani-supported armed struggle in Kashmir. As of late 1993, Mrs. Bhutto has been stressing the centrality of the annexation of the entire portion of Kashmir for the long-term development of Pakistan. This strong position is based on Islamabad's perception of its vital interests as a key player in the PRC's Trans-Asian design. It did not take long for Islamabad to realise that the opening of Central Asia with Pakistan as the gateway to the Indian Ocean could become the key to Pakistan's economic growth.

However, engineering studies on potential routes for a new railway line to connect Karachi and Central Asia concluded that if such a line is to be viable from the economic point of view - both costs of construction and of operations - it must pass through Indian Kashmir. By the fall if 1993, Islamabad had to confront the reality that Pakistan's true gateway to the PRC and into Central Asia - the path to the future and strategic salvation of Pakistan - lay through Indian Kashmir.

Islamabad is not willing to accept the fact that its vital strategic life-line should pass through the territory of its arch-nemesis, India. As New Delhi began discussing the possibility of elections in Kashmir - a process that would legitimise Indian sovereignty over Kashmir - it became imperative for Islamabad not only to destabilise the area to the point of postponement of the elections, but to escalate the armed struggle to a point where the Indians would be forced to withdraw. Considering the crucial importance of Indian Kashmir to Islamabad's emerging vital interests, Islamabad can see no substitute for the annexation of this area to Pakistan.

It is this strategic consideration that has had such a major effect on the conduct and intensity of the armed struggle in India Kashmir. Consequently, the ISI is not only the sponsoring and guiding force behind the escalation, but it has assumed direct control over key operations which are conducted by loyal foreigners, including Afghans and Arabs to ensure a semblance of deniability. At the operational level, there is a distinct "Afghanisation" of the struggle. Harkat-ul-Ansar, the militant wing of Lashkar-e-Tayeba with headquarters in Muridke near Lahore, have very few Indian Kashmiris in the ranks of their elite fighters. Another active organisation, Al Barq, comprises a mix of Indian Kashmiris, Afghans and Pakistani Kashmiris. Furthermore, both Markaz Dawa al Irshad and Al Barq are closely associated with Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam of Pakistan under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman. All together. there are well over 5,000 foreign Mujahideen in the ranks of the Kashmiri Islamist organisations - most of them from Pakistan (non-Kashmiris), Afghanistan, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain. The thousands of Mujahideen born in Azad (Pakistani) Kashmir are not counted here.

The key Islamist terrorist operations in Kashmir since the spring of 1995 testifies to this trend:

On 10 May 1995, on the Muslim holiday Id-ul-Zuha, Islamist terrorists burned down the 14th century shrine to Sheikh Nooruddin Wali (Kashmir's patron saint that is revered by Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs) and the adjoining Khankah mosque in Charar-e-Sharief, some 18 miles Southwest of Srinagar, Indian Kashmir. The building were torched in the middle of a clash with Indian security forces initiated by the Islamist terrorists. The terrorist force comprised some 150 Mujahideen of Harkat-ul-Ansar, Hizbul-Mujahideen, and Al-Fatah Force under the command of Mast Gul (an Afghan national). In Muzzaffarabad, Pakistan, the headquarters of ISI-sponsored Mujahideen, Sardar Basharat Ahmed Khan of Harkat-ul-Ansar acknowledged that many of the Mujahideen in Charar-e-Sharief were actually Pakistani nationals, some not even Kashmiri. He explained that "40 or 42 of the Mujahideen killed belonged to Harkat-ul-Ansar and 26 of them hailed from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan."

On August 1, Mast Gul returned to Muzzaffarabad to a hero's welcome by a cheering crowd of several thousands. He had withdrawn into Azad Kashmir with about 100 terrorists in late July. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the head of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam party, accompanied Gul in his triumphant return, describing him in a fiery speech as a living symbol of Kashmir's Jihad. The mere presence of Qazi Hussain Ahmed is of importance. As of April 1995, in his capacity as the leader of Islamic Jihad of Pakistan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed was nominated by the leadership of the Khartoum-based Armed Islamic Movement (AIM) to be in charge of the terrorist headquarters and regional centre in Karachi that is responsible for Islamist activities (training, equipping, operational support, etc.) in Pakistan (including Indian Kashmir), Afghanistan, and Albania (including Kosovo).

By now, Kashmir was already at the height of a still lingering crisis: the kidnapping and holding of Western tourists. On July 4, a shadowy group of 12-15 terrorists abducted numerous Western tourists from the Lidder Valley area, about 32 kilometres from Pahalgam. Some of the tourists were released but one succeeded in escaping, leaving six in captivity. The terrorist group, which identified itself as Al-Faran, seems to be connected with the Harkat-ul-Ansar. The kidnapping detachment comprised 16 terrorists - twelve from Azad (Pakistani) Kashmir, two from Afghanistan, and two Indian Kashmiris who act as guides. The terrorists were equipped with sophisticated weapons and modern communications equipment. They seem well organised and seem to enjoy pre-installed strong logistic support at each of their hide-outs. Moreover, Maulana Fazlur Rahman was approached by the UK in an effort to negotiate with the kidnappers and was even granted visa for a "private" visit to India. This alone confirms the general leaning of the Al-Faran. For, as mentioned earlier, the Taliban, another protégé group of Rahman, is closely associated with the ISI.

The infusion of foreigners - mainly Afghans, Pakistani Kashmiris and 'Afghans' - into the ranks of the Kashmiri Islamist terrorist, has altered the character of this armed struggle. Irrespective of the true aspirations of the Muslim population of Indian Kashmir, the armed struggle currently waged in their name has very little to do with their fate and future. Through the ISI's manipulations, Islamabad has transformed the Kashmiri struggle into a drive for Kashmir's unification with Pakistan and away from the quest for Kashmiri self-determination and independence from both India and Pakistan. This is only natural considering that Islamabad's primary objective is to bring Kashmir under Pakistani control so that the key transportation routes can be built in order to feed into the Silk Route.

TAJIKISTAN

Perhaps the most audacious outgrowth of the ISI's Afghan operations is the Islamist surge into Tajikistan in order to consolidate control over segments of the Silk Road itself.

The roots of the ISI operations in Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan can be traced to the spring of 1990, when the ISI established its "Afghan" Takhar Regiment. This unit was some 2,000-2,500 troop strong. It was the most tightly controlled "Afghan" unit, and the best equipped. Ostensibly, this unit belonged to Hizbul-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and had been prepared by the ISI for resistance operations near the Soviet border. The troops were provided the most comprehensive military training given to Afghans. Resistance sources described this unit as being turned into "a conventional army" by the ISI. In early April 1990, the force was virtually combat ready and the ISI expected to commit this Afghan Army to battle within a month once the mountain passes leading into Badakhshan were completely open. These ISI-controlled Mujahideen constitute the core of the Afghan force currently supporting the Islamist insurgency in Central Asia.

Meanwhile, regional strategic priorities were quickly changing. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growing chaos in Central Asia, it became imperative for Beijing to prevent the emergence of either a pro-Moscow or a nationalist regime in Tajikistan. Beijing is dead set against having a Moscow-dominated regime on its border given the nationalist fervour of the new Russian elite. Furthermore, Beijing is apprehensive about the spread of Central Asian quest for Islamic self-identity across the border into its volatile Xinjiang Province. The best way to reduce the threat of both developments is to destabilise any future Tajik government. The ensuing escalation of special and terrorist operations from northern Afghanistan into Central Asia, sponsored by the ISI, but serving Chinese interests, can be seen as a further development and expansion of the mutual long-term strategic co-operation between the two countries.

The major escalation in the Islamist involvement in Tajikistan started in late 1990. At that time, Vladimir Petkel, the Chief of the Tajik KGB, stressed that "subversive activities against Tajikistan have been stepped up," and that he feared " an outburst of subversive activities in local areas." The KGB correctly identified this outburst of violence as the beginning of a regional surge. The ISI was soon identified as the driving force behind this campaign. Anatoli Beloyusov, Deputy Director of the KGB, warned that the "strengthened influence of the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism" in Tajikistan was "directly linked to increased activities by Pakistani special services." He described a Pakistani "Program M" intended to "destabilise the socio-political situation in the USSR's Central Asian republics."

In late 1993, Tajik Islamists with active support from Arab 'Afghans' planned at least two major spectacular sabotage operations that were prevented in the last minute by Russian Special Forces operating under the 201st MRD's Kulyab regiment. The first operation was an attempt to place three truck-bombs driven by suicide drivers under the massive Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station. The operation was prevented when the Russians ambushed and shot the drivers to death on their approach to the dam. Had the trucks exploded as planned, the ensuing wave would have inundated over 2,000 villages and seven cities in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The failure of this audacious attempt could not reverse the escalation of terrorism in Tajikistan. Other terrorist operations, though less spectacular, were successful. It was not by accident that the most important operations in this cycle were aimed at the major axes of transportation. For example, on 26 November 1993, a powerful bomb derailed the main train between Termez (Afghan border, Uzbekistan) and Khalton (Tajikistan). The bomb exploded near

Kurgan-Tyube (Tajikistan). The terrorists came from the direction of Afghanistan. By now, it was becoming clear that the Tajik Jihad was also being transformed into a component of a regional Jihad sponsored by the ISI and employing members of a joint mixed pool of Mujahideen.

A REGIONAL ISI NETWORK

In early December 1993, during a state visit to Pakistan, the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Maulana Arsalan Rahmani, admitted that Afghanistan was providing military assistance to various Islamist insurgencies because "we cannot remain aloof from what is happening to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Burma, Palestine and elsewhere... We are not terrorists but Mujahideen fighting for restoring peace and preserving honour." He acknowledged that Afghanistan also played a major role in the consolidation of the Harkat-ul-Ansar. The support for this kind of unity was but part of the active support given by Afghanistan to the Islamist fighters in Kashmir, Tajikistan, and Bosnia "There are about 8,000 members of Harkat-ul-Ansar who are supporting the Kashmiri struggle against Indian occupation," Maulana Arsalan Rahmani stated.

By early 1994, there was a growing volume of evidence to suggest that the ISI was running the various insurgency and terrorist campaigns as part of a single master plan. For example, in mid-February 1994, the Indian security forces captured two senior ISI operatives inside Kashmir: Sajjad Afghani Khan and Mohammad Massud Azhar, both veterans of the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Mohammed Massud Azhar is also a veteran trainer and organiser, long involved in preparing expert cadres in ISI camps in Pakistan for operation in hostile and challenging environments such as Kashmir, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. For example, Azhar organised a force of 50-60 ISI-controlled Pakistani operatives which is still conducting special operations in Tajikistan under the banner of Nahza Islam.

It should be remembered that the key Afghan forces- both regular and irregular- in the area are under the control of General Dostum who has reached several "understandings" with the ISI on co-existence and co-operation in the pursuit of common objectives.

As with the Kashmiri Islamist armed struggle, the growing involvement of the ISI in Afghanistan was immediately followed by a noticeable infusion of foreign "volunteers". In the spring of 1995, the Afghan Mujahideen were joined by a large number of Arab fighters - both veteran 'Afghans' and younger volunteers. All of them are well trained members of numerous radical militant Islamist organisations, many of which are very active in toppling governments in their home countries (such as Egypt and Algeria). These organisations have offices and camps in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities. These Arabs arrived in the camps in northern Afghanistan in an organised fashion from Pakistan, bringing with them large quantities of weapons, ammunition and other equipment. Additional Arab volunteers and supplies continue to arrive from Peshawar.

By mid 1995, the emerging leadership of the high quality Tajik Mujahideen was the Movement of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan (DIVT). The most important DIVT commander has been identified as "Tajik Mujahideen Commanding General R. Sadirov". On June 12, they assassinated Col. Izatullo Kuganov - the commander of a Tajikistan SPETSNAZ unit and a close political ally of President Emomali Rakhmonov. This assassination is not an isolated case but rather the first of a trend. Russian intelligence has learned that the Pakistan-trained elite Mujahideen have been instructed that "they should destroy first of all Russian support for the Government of Tajikistan". Should this happen, the road will be open for a militant surge into, and throughout, Central Asia.

CONCLUSION

This ISI-sponsored insurgency and terrorism along the western gateway to China is a strategic development which has grave ramifications. The PRC is increasingly apprehensive about the revival of Islamist sentiments, including a fledgling armed struggle in Xinjiang, and a growing Russian influence over the former Soviet states of Central Asia. Considering its global strategic orientation, Beijing is happy with the Pakistani subversion of these states and the ISI's confrontation with Russian influence. Beijing is most satisfied with the fact that these Pakistani operations serve the PRC's regional interests without getting the PRC actually involved or even implicated in the covert operations. The net result of these ISI-sponsored covert operations is a further increase in the Chinese influence and the consolidation of anti-West posture along the Trans-Asian Axis.

Pakistan is determined to become a power to be reckoned with by its mere control over choke-points, not achievements or economic capabilities. The sponsoring of terrorism and subversion by the ISI is presently Islamabad's primary and proven instrument in the great endeavour.

The opinions expressed in this article are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, US Congress, or any other branch of the US Government.

Author: Yossef Bodansky
[Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US Congress and the World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies (Houston Texas). He is a contributing editor for Defence and Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy, the author of three books (Target America, Terror, and Crisis in Korea), several book chapters, entries for the International Military and Defence Encyclopaedia, and numerous articles in several periodicals including Global Affairs, Jane's Defence Weekly, Defence and Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy and Business Week. In the 1980's he acted as a senior consultant for the Department of Defence and the Department of State.]

Date: October 1995