During the past year (1995), there was no change in the order of naval forces in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, in terms of the strengths of their principal combatants (Table I). Amongst the twelve indigenous navies of the region possessing major surface and sub-surface combatants, India continued to remain the largest, followed by Pakistan, Australia, Indonesia, Iran, and Thailand. In view of the number and nature of major warships planned to be acquired in the near future by countries such as Australia, Thailand, and Singapore, the position of naval forces is expected to change next year.

The most notable will be that of the Royal Thai Navy, which is planning to launch its first aircraft carrier early this year. The 11,500-tonne carrier, presently being built in Spain, is scheduled to be commissioned into the Thai Navy in July 1997. This will result in the possession of carriers by two countries of the Indian Ocean littoral. The most significant aspect of the expansion/modernisation of South Asian and Indian Ocean navies last year was in terms of submarine forces. As clearly evident from Table I, major submarine acquisitions have been planned, and are presently being implemented. In effect, a dramatic increase is expected to take place in the number of patrol submarines operated by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean within the next six or seven years.

The maritime reconnaissance/strike capabilities of the navies in South Asia and the Indian Ocean also underwent major developments during the past year. This was primarily in relation to the formalisation of the new international Law of the Sea in late 1994. During the past year, China continued to maintain a keen interest in the seas around India. The nature and extent of Chinese activities in Myanmar could lead to a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the near future. Amongst the extra-regional naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the most important development last year was the creation, for the first time ever, of a permanently deployed American fleet for a part of the Indian Ocean. These developments have serious implications for Indian security and the Indian Navy. Simply put, the declining force levels of the Indian Navy are clearly in contradiction to the major trends apparent for naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

TRENDS IN SUBMARINE FORCES

Amongst these navies, Pakistan and Australia maintained active submarine construction programmes in 1995, while South Africa carried out a major upgrade programme. Meanwhile, Singapore finally decided to start a submarine arm for its navy, and India planned to build additional submarines in the country.

Pakistan's submarine construction programme was the result of a substantial naval arms agreement with France in late September 1994, worth about a billion U.S. dollars. This contracted for the construction of three advanced technology Agosta 90-B diesel-electric submarines for Pakistan. These new 1,700-tonne boats are to possess a vast amount of sophisticated technology, including a closed-cycle steam turbine MESMA Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system to enhance the submerged endurance of the submarine, as well as a number of lethal Exocet SM-39 underwater launched anti-ship missiles. Both the AIP system and the anti-ship missiles are to be exported by France for the first time.

In terms of the agreement, the first submarine is to be built in France, the second will be built in France but assembled in Pakistan, while the third boat will be built in Pakistan with the transfer of a substantial technology package. The keel of the first submarine was laid at the DCN shipyard in Cherbourg in France in the autumn of 1995. The boat, yet to be named, is scheduled to be launched in late 1997, and commissioned about a year later. Meanwhile, the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) also began making preparations for the work to be carried out on the second and third submarines. This will entail building considerable specialised infrastructure for submarine assembly and construction. The second and third submarines are scheduled to be commissioned into the Pakistani Navy in 1999 and 2002. By this time its four old Daphne-class submarines would have begun to decommission.

During 1995, Australia launched the second of its planned six Collins-class submarines, and continued to carry out the sea trials of the first boat of this class. The commissioning of this 3,000-tonne submarine, launched in August 1993, has been delayed from November 1995 to early 1996. Although it is believed to have performed well in the trials conducted so far, difficulties relating to the software of its highly sophisticated combat system have been reported. The construction of these Swedish Kockums Type 471 submarines in Australia, as a replacement for the ageing Oberon-class boats, was the result of a major naval arms agreement in June 1987. All the six submarines, to be armed with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, are expected to be commissioned into the Australian Navy by the end of the decade. This would coincide with the decomissioning of the Navy's three remaining Oberon submarines.

During 1995, the South African Navy carried out a major upgrade programme to improve the combat effectiveness of its three Oberon-class submarines. In the wake of the 1988 upgrade programme, which focused on electronic systems, the 1995 programme emphasised the full integration of the boats' system, as well as improved supportability. The upgrade programme underway emphasises the use of software-driven systems as well as commercial off-the-shelf components. This includes the total revamp of the sonar system, the modernisation of the search and attack periscopes, and extensive work on the Electronic Support Measures (ESM) sub-system. In addition, new action information systems, navigation systems, and communications suite, have been acquired for the submarines. The first completely upgraded system in the Navy's Oberon-class submarine continues to undergo operational test and evaluation. They are expected to keep the three submarines operational through the year 2005, by which time replacement submarines are expected to be commissioned.

Over the years, Singapore's plans for the acquisition of submarines appeared to be the most ambitious amongst the Indian Ocean littoral states of South-east Asia. At various times in the past, it had conveyed an interest in leasing two small 800-tonne boats, in addition to buying four larger new construction boats, by the end of the decade. Finally, in late September 1995, Singapore decided to purchase a second hand 1200-tonne diesel electric submarine from Sweden. This is the first time that Singapore will be operating a submarine in its navy. The Kockums Type A-12 submarine, launched in 1967, is armed only with torpedoes, not anti-ship missiles. In view of this decision, Singapore is not expected to acquire any German HDW Type 206 submarines for the time being.

Meanwhile, in January 1995 the Thai government came close to giving final approval to a programme for the purchase of two or three modern submarines for the Navy. Quite unexpectedly, this proposal ran into some difficulty, with the budgetary request being delayed in Cabinet. Later in the year, the proposal for the submarines appeared to be ready for approval. In this respect, at least four European submarine builders had submitted bids to the Royal Thai Navy by the end of the year. These comprised DCN of France, HDW of Germany, Kockums of Sweden, and RDM-VSEL of the Netherlands and Britain. In addition, Russia's Kilo-class submarines are also expected to compete for the order. Moreover, the submarines finally chosen are expected to be equipped with American technologies and sub-systems. In January 1995, the American administration eased restrictions on American companies seeking to provide such items to South-East Asia. As a result, companies like the Loral Corporation have already begun to market submarine fire control and navigation systems to Thailand.

During the past year, Iran continued to wait in vain for the delivery of its third Kilo-class submarine ordered from Russia. Although it officially maintained that the transfer could be expected any time, it does not appear likely to take place due to heightened American sensitivities over the deal. Nonetheless, Iran proved it had overcome the problems associated with its submarine batteries by carrying out major naval exercise during the year involving the Kilo-class boats.

Although the Malaysian government approved the acquisition of four patrol submarines for its navy - two new construction and two older boats - as early as 1990, its decision remained to be implemented in 1995.

The delivery of two additional submarines for Indonesia from Germany also did not take place last year.

At the annual Navy Day press conference held towards the end of last year, the Chief of the Indian Navy, Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, stated that the construction of two additional HDW submarines would commence soon at the country's Mazagon shipyard in Bombay. This would, in effect, complete the abruptly concluded 1981 order with HDW for six submarines (in view of the financial scandal which erupted in the late 1980s). According to the United Nations Conventional Arms Register, a full submarine kit had already been tranferred from Germany to India in 1992. This decision of the government will rejuvenate submarine construction facilities at the shipyard, lying idle for nearly four years, since the launch of the second indigenously-constructed HDW submarine in 1992. As the year ended, considerable speculation remained over the transfer of possibly two, but as many as six, additional Kilo-class Type 636 submarines from Russia to India.

In view of the diesel-electric submarines planned (including those currently being built) or those projected, some 24-30 boats are expected to be commissioned into the navies of the Indian Ocean littoral by the year 2002-2003. This could increase to 53 the number of submarines operated by these countries alone, from the 32 at present.

TRENDS IN MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE/STRIKE CAPABILITIES

The past year was one of the most important in the tumultuous thirteen year history of the Law of the Sea. It was during this period that the International Seabed Authority (ISA) came into existence, and the maritime zones of littoral countries could be further extended in less than ten years to 300 nautical miles from the 200 nautical miles delineated so far.

These developments came in the wake of the formalisation of the international law of the Sea in late 1994. The ISA was of special importance to India as it was the only littoral country of the Indian Ocean to have marked a 150,000 sq. km. site in the area, off Cochin, for the exploitation of polymetallic nodules from the seabed in the future. On the other hand, the potential extension of a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 100 nautical miles, on the basis of a preliminary exploration of the additional zone, focused considerable attention on the maritime reconnaissance/strike (MR/S) capabilities of a number of countries of the Indian Ocean region. At present, eight littoral states of the Indian Ocean maintain dedicated MR/S capabilities in their Air Force or Navy. The largest is that of Australia, which operates a fleet of 19 Lockheed P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), armed with lethal anti-ship missiles, in its Air Force. This is followed by the maritime strike capabilities of the Pakistani Navy, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Iranian Navy.

Other countries possessing maritime reconnaissance/Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities, include the Indian Navy, the Indonesian Navy, the Malaysian Navy, and the Sri Lankan Navy. Amongst these countries, both Pakistan and Thailand expanded their maritime MR/S capabilities in 1995, while Australia prepared for an extensive refurbishment of its Orion MPAs. The Pakistani Navy's MR/S force of four Dassault Breguet Atlantic aircraft since late 1988, expanded in 1995 through the order for French submarines, as well as the passage of the Hank Brown Amendment in the American Congress. In a bid to induce Pakistan to acquire French submarines in late 1994, France agreed to supply three additional Atlantic aircraft to Pakistan. Although these aircraft were ostensibly to be used for spares for the Atlantics already in the Pakistani Navy, it appears that this did not take place. Reports in 1995 indicated that the aircraft were in store and available for use when required.

In addition, the most important and lethal of the American arms and equipment provided to Pakistan through the Brown Amendment in late 1995, consisted of three P-3C-II Orion MPAs, along with their complement of Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Pakistani pilots have already been trained on this aircraft prior to 1990, when their transfer was barred in view of the Pressler Amendment. It is expected, therefore, that these aircraft will commence patrolling the Arabian Sea soon after transfer. In effect, Pakistan's MR/S capability more than doubled in 1995, from a force of four aircraft to that of ten. Moreover, the Orions provide major advantages over the Atlantics in terms of both reach and strike capability.

These factors essentially enable the Pakistani Navy to conduct offensive maritime air operations on a far greater scale and depth than ever before. During 1995, the Royal Thai Navy also acquired two more P-3A Orion MPAs for its naval air force. This brought the total number of Orions in the Thai navy to five. Meanwhile, the Australian Air Force began preparing for a major avionics and structural upgrade of all its P-3C Orion MPAs. This would be carried out in batches from 1997 to about the year 2001, and is expected to extend the life of the force till at least the year 2015. The programme also includes the purchase of associated ground-based facilities, and three ex-U.S. Navy P-3Bs that are being converted to training aircraft. The upgrade programme will involve the employment of a new radar; a modern acoustic processing system; and a new data management system.

THE CHINESE NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

They could permit shipping in the area to be monitored, and provide Chinese warships docking, resupply, and maintenance facilities, therby enhancing their combat capability in the Indian Ocean. Since the middle of 1992, reports have persistently indicated Chinese assistance in the construction of naval and electronic facilities in Myanmar. These essentially relate to the construction of deep-water facilities and additional infrastructure at the naval base on Hianggyi island at the mouth of the Bassein river, the modernisation of existing naval facilities at Akyab and Mergui, and the establishment and operation of a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) station at Great Coco island. Although early assessments indicate that the Hianggyi base, when finally completed, will be too small to host Chinese surface warships of the size required for effective operations in the Indian Ocean, it may just be too soon to reach such a conclusion.

Moreover, the activities being carried out could be used to support diesel-electric submarines being transferred from Russia in a major naval arms agreement finalised last year. In terms of the agreement, China initially plans to acquire four, but possibly as many as ten, Kilo-class submarines at a rate of one to two boats a year. The first submarine of this type was transferred to China last year, with the second to be delivered early this year. Chinese activities on the strategically located Great Coco island, at a distance of only some 30 nautical miles from the Indian Andaman chain of islands, is of particular concer. In 1993, some 70 Chinese naval and engineering personnel are believed to have arrived on the island to assist in the installation of a new radar facility. This could enable China to monitor Indian naval communications in the area, and possibly even India's missile tests off its eastern coast. China is also upgrading Myanmarese naval facilities at Akyab, and port facilities at Mergui.

In addition, Myanmar has agreed to the presence of Chinese military instructors on its territory to provide training to its armed forces personnel. The strong defence relationship between the two countries can also be seen from the nature and extent of Chinese arms transfers to Myanmar recently. The initial 1 billion U.S. dollar arms deal in 1992 was followed by a further deal of 400 million U.S. dollars in 1994. This new agreement includes six Hainan-class patrol ships and a number of small gunboats for its Navy. Myanmar already operates 10 ex-Chinese Hainan-class ships, and is reportedly negotiating with China for the purchase of two missile-armed Jianghu-class frigates. If this naval transfer does come through, it will represent the first time that Myanmar will operate warships of this size and nature.

Intensification of Chinese activity in the Andaman Sea can also be seen from the success of the Indian Coast Guard in August 1994, when it apprehended three Chinese trawlers, flying the Myanmarese flag, in Indian waters off Narcondam island. Aboard the trawlers were several detailed charts clearly identifying hydrographic details of the waters around the Andaman islands. The trawlers were believed to have been heading towards the Great Coco island. It is clearly not perceived that China will be granted exclusive control over the naval base in Hanggyi or the SIGINT facility on Great Coco island. However, in view of its military relationship with Myanmar, it is expected to be granted some sort of access to the former, and receive data from the latter. The extent to which Myanmar at present is sharing India-related intelligence data with China is not known.

THE U.S. FIFTH FLEET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The American naval presence in the Indian Ocean has now been reinforced by the Fifth Fleet for the Persian Gulf, warships of the Seventh Fleet deployed in the Indian Ocean, additional rotationally deployed forces, and forward stationed forces in the area. The Fifth fleet created last year is quite different from the fleet of the same name which operated in the Pacific Ocean, but was disbanded soon after the conclusion of the Second World War. The new Fifth fleet was activated in July 1995, with its headquarters located at Mina Sulman in Bahrain. It will come under the operational jurisdiction of the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, Vice-Admiral John S. Redd. Its area of responsibility includes the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the western part of the Indian Ocean. The United States has officially justified the creation of the fleet on the basis that it is essentially symbolic in nature, to reinforce America's long-term military commitment to the region. It is stated, therefore, that American military force levels in the region will not increase, but simply be consolidated. However, in view of American naval strategy and shifting force levels, this explanation does not appear credible. A major aim of American policy, as enunciated in the February 1995 document on "U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", is to enhance the security of the country, to be achieved by the maintenance of a strong defence capability and the promotion of cooperative security measures.

In this endeavour, American naval doctrine in the post-Cold War world has undergone a dramatic transformation. From its focus on open-ocean war fighting on the sea, it has increasingly shifted to one of power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea, in order to influence events in the littoral regions of the world. This strategic concept has been further expanded to encompass the employment of naval expeditionary forces and joint operation missions. In essence, therefore, the creation of the Fifth fleet represents this fundamental aspect of American naval policy, and ought not to be seen simply as a symbolic act. This is especially true for the two countries in the region with which it has hostile relations, Iraq and Iran.

Moreover, the nature and extent of the force level associated with the Fifth fleet has not been clearly defined. In effect, over the years there has been a major increase in the number of warships and naval aircraft associated with Central Command in the Persian Gulf. While the U.S. Central Command, with Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, clearly did not have a fleet under its command till less than a year ago, it used to take over command of naval forces deployed in the region. On average, this comprised a single carrier battle group, consisting of five principal surface combatants (including an aircraft carrier), two nuclear-powered submarines, and one support ship. On the activation of the Fifth fleet in July 1995, it comprised 15 warships including the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. By early September, this force had doubled to comprise 31 ships. This increase was due partly to the arrival of seven military sealift vessels, which arrived in the Gulf at the end of August as part of the US deployment. They carried heavy weapons and equipment for a 17,000 man Marine expeditionary force and 5,000 man mechanised army brigade.

Furthermore, by the middle of September, American naval forces in the Gulf had increased to some 43 warships, including support ships; albeit on a temporary basis, in view of the joint exercises held with Kuwaiti forces. The departure of the single American aircraft carrier from the Persian Gulf in the middle of October, for just over a two month period, was compensated for by the deployment of an additional five warships in the area, along with under 30 fighter and transport aircraft at Sheik Eissa airbase in southern Bahrain. Moreover, the inherent firepower of the warships in the Gulf, in terms of their capability to launch guided weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, had increased by 200% since the end of the Gulf war in 1991, according to an official statement of the U.S. Navy issued in late 1995.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDIAN NAVY

Moreover, the scheduled decommissioning of the two aircraft carriers (the first towards the end of the year, and the second in six or seven years) in the absence of any replacement in place, will effectively end the Navy's balanced force structure, and capacity for blue water operations. In effect, a major change in naval doctrine and tactics will have to be thought out, prior to a major compensatory programme of naval acquisitions. The major trends in submarines and maritime reconnaissance/strike forces in the Indian Ocean point to the need to maintain a carrier arm in the Indian Navy for effective Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and naval air operations. The modernization of the submarine arm is clearly another priority concer. While the recent statement of the naval chief is welcomed, it needs to be taken much further, in view especially of the emerging challenges to be faced from the Chinese Navy.

The interest displayed by China in the Indian Ocean, especially in terms of the construction and use of naval facilities in Myanmar, indicates the possibility of a Chinese naval presence in the area in the near future. Initially, the Indian Navy would primarily need to be prepared to deal with Chinese submarines in the Bay of Bengal. In the absence of any effective carrier-launched ASW force, this task would assume nightmarish proportions. The U.S. Fifth fleet in the Indian Ocean will remain a potential source of concern to the Indian Navy. While it may not directly attempt to influence Indian naval operations, the permanency of its presence signifies highly sophisticated weapon sytems and far superior firepower in proximity to Indian waters. The nature of the political relationship between the two countries will determine the level of rhetoric to which the Fifth fleet will periodically be subjected to in public. Nonetheless, further developments in relation to it need to be watched carefully in India.

Transparency in the number and nature of warships in the fleet should be encouraged, and would be welcomed by the Indian Navy. The year ahead promises to be far more important for the Indian Navy than the past year. Notwithstanding the general elections scheduled for the year, major acqusitions for the Navy are expected to be decided, including that of a replacement aircraft carrier. The naval budget for 1996-1997 is correspondingly expected to rise even further in real terms than the budget provided the previous year. More important, the decisions taken during the year will have a critical bearing on the size and nature of the Indian Navy in the early part of the next century.

Author: Rahul Ray-Choudhury
Date: January 1996