Vasabjit Banerjee, a doctoral student from Indiana University, Bloomington, argued that there was little evidence of international factors having played a role in exacerbating tensions between India and Pakistan. That it was not uncertainty and insecurity imposed by India’s overwhelming material superiority, which has impelled Pakistan to balance India, but the nature of the Pakistani state that demands this competition in order to legitimise itself with the Pakistani nation.

Gen. Vinod Saighal argued that Pakistan’s dismemberment would enhance the stability of the Indian Subcontinent. He argued that many of the extraterritorial assets of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) acquired via the ill-fated Bank of Credit and Commerce International were not amenable even to control by the Pakistani establishment. In this vein, he raised the issue of the very nature of the Pakistani state: if it is merely a territorially bounded political entity. He stated that there were parts of Afghanistan and Bangladesh where the ISID have more control than the local and central administration. Moreover, in certain tactical areas of military operations the Pakistani Armed Forces are more advanced than their Indian counterparts. Consequently, even though Pakistan has been thoroughly infiltrated by the US intelligence agencies after the start of the War on Terror, the combination of its intelligence assets and military strength makes it a menace for peace and stability in the Subcontinent.

Mr. Vikram Sood supported Vasabjit Banerjee’s thesis by arguing that a compact between military and landed elites underwrites military supremacy in Pakistani domestic politics. However, he disagreed with the thesis presented by Vasabjit Banerjee that Islam acts as a bridge between the sectarian and provincial differences that exist in Pakistan: He posited that treating Pakistan through the prism of an Islamic homeland exacerbates the insecurities of India’s Muslim minority. He stated that Pakistan should be treated as any other state with its own set of internal problems. From an international perspective, he stated that Pakistan had become a playground between a rising China and the US that wants to control the events affecting terrorism in the region. Moreover, the US would never allow the dismemberment of Pakistan, an old ally. Consequently, it was best that the central element behind Pakistan’s foreign and security policy, the Armed Forces, be tackled by India. He argued that President Musharraf was caught in a pincer due to election of 2007 and seeks a resolution to the Kashmir issue before the elections. This is because of two reasons. First, to prevent a further polarisation of society based on the issue, which would allow Jehadi groups to take over the country. Second, to maintain legitimacy in the face of a return to civilian rule under either Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto; both leaders would make sure to reduce the status of the Armed Forces to a secondary, if not subordinate, institution.

Mr. Mahendra Ved argued that Pakistan remains central to US foreign policy in the subcontinent. And, Pakistani opposition to India has become a cornerstone of its foreign policy, though the Pakistani military leadership has been successful in wooing India when it is required. He argued that a weak Pakistan could present the same problems that present day Bangladesh does to India: economic dependence and illegal immigration accompanied by worsening security issues. He stated that successive Indian administrations have relied on a strategy of tactical reaction rather than create a long-term strategy to tackle the problems that Pakistan presents to India.

Cdr. Alok Bansal followed on the lines of Gen. Saighal, but argued that the success of Pakistani state ultimately justifies the truth of the two-nation theory. He stressed that the Pakistani Armed Forces were central to the continued existence of Pakistan through the legitimating glue of an anti-India national security state. Consequently, as anti-India sentiments were central to the continued primacy of the Army, if India maintained a friendly façade towards Pakistan the primacy of the Armed forces and the cohesion of the Pakistani state would be severely threatened. He disagreed with Mr. Sood when he stated that the US would allow Pakistan to disintegrate if it were in its interests.

General Chopra disagreed with the general tenor of the previous speakers by stating that the dismemberment of Pakistan is not probable. India should instead undertake covert operations against it. He posited three alternative identities of the Pakistani state. First, an Islamic Pakistan ruled by a mullah-military combine. Second, a national security combine comprised of landed elites or the ‘establishment’ and the military that legitimizes itself by antagonism towards India. Finally, a democratic Pakistan that empathises with India’s security concerns regarding domestic and regional stability. He further stated that it was in China’s interest to have a mullah-military alliance ruling Pakistan, which could keep India bogged down in South Asia via its neighbours. On this note, journalist, Suvojit Baghci queried about Indian strategy toward Islamic groups based in Bangladesh that were helping sponsor terrorism in India. Following this, Ashutosh Mishra argued that India was not capable of influencing Pakistani politics. He asked participants to consider whether a strong India was in Pakistan’s interest.

M. Guruswamy presented his analysis of Pakistan’s capabilities and India’s capability to affect Pakistani domestic politics. He argued that due to help from the US the Pakistani economy was back in good health. However, India continued to face two major problems with regards to Pakistan. First, the continued confrontation and proxy conflict over Kashmir. Second, Pakistani sponsoring of Islamic terrorism in India, which was now independent of the Kashmir issue. The second point implicitly underscored Mr. Sood’s notion that Pakistani was attempting to link its Islamic identity to Indian minority politics. He posited a two-track policy towards Pakistan. First, India should attack Islamic fundamentalism with a mailed fist of enhanced internal security arrangements and covert operations. Second, it should publicly treat Pakistani concerns with a velvet glove of concern and pro-active solutions. The combination of an outwardly friendly appearance, accompanied by covert operations, would both delegitimise the notion of a hegemonic India and help Pakistan on its way to dismemberment.

Professor Santhanam concluded the presentations by raising three interlinked issues. He stated that the India-Pakistan relationship was hostage to the territory of Kashmir and the symbolic strength it holds for the countries. Furthermore, India should consider using Indian businesses for locking in Pakistan interdependence on peace and stability in India. And, third, he considered what the effects of Pakistan’s passing on nuclear secrets to other countries on Indian and international interests would be.

Analysis:

Two common threads of consensus seemed to reappear in every presentation. There was an overall consensus on continuing level two contacts with Pakistan: increasing people to people contacts, investments and enhanced public relations with Pakistan. There was also an implicit consensus on India restarting covert operations in Pakistan. A subtler variation of this consensus was India’s helping restart the democratisation process in Pakistan. Two further elements evolved during the course of the conference. First, the India-Pakistan relationship could not be separated from the relationships these countries had with other international powers, whether it be the US or China. Second, India had to consider the long run costs and benefits of any future political and territorial change in Pakistan.